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Abstract
Part I of this Comment will discuss the development of the Chinese IP system and discuss
why it has been ineffective in protecting pharmaceutical patents by comparing it to the US patent
system. Part II analyzes the third amendment to the Chinese patent law and how it protects patents,
particularly pharmaceutical ones, and deters counterfeiters from infringing upon the patents. Part
II also presents different views on the effectiveness of the third amendment to protect patents.
Part III argues that even though the third amendment is a great leap forward, pharmaceutical
counterfeiting will continue to happen if the local governments do not cooperate with the central
government in enforcing patent protection laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Deemed to be in her Golden Age, China seeks to be a major
player in the global economy' and is determined to enter the
global intellectual property ("IP") market.2 With global trade
concerns pressuring international businesses to pursue
intellectual property rights ("IPR") and China's own desire for
recognition in the global IP market, China has continuously
increased her efforts to strengthen her domestic IPR protection
laws to conform to the World Trade Organization's ("WTO")
more stringent requirements.3 Unfortunately, despite China's
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1. See Wei Shi, Incurable or Remediable? Clues to Undoing the Gordian Knot Tied by
Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement in China, 30 U. PA. INT'l L.J. 541, 542 (2008)
(noting that China has a strong desire to become part of the global economy); see also
Kim -Kwong Chan, China's Socioeconomic Changes and the Implications for the Religion-State
Dynamic in China, 2004 BYU IL. REv. 325, 325 (stating that China has become an
important player in the world economy).
2. See Dina Bronshtein, Comment, Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals in China: Could
Changes Bring Stronger Protection for Intellectual Property Rights and Human Health?, 7 PAC.
RiM. I. & P01'Y J. 439, 445 (2008) (reporting that China is seeking to become a
legitimate participant in the global intellectual property ("IP") community); Shi, supra
note 1, at 542 (explaining that Chinese I1P rights legislation has stepped up efforts to
bring her domestic laws into conformity with her World Trade Organization ("WTO")
commitments).
3. See Bronshtein, supra note 2, at 447 (asserting that China has amended her IP
laws numerous times to comply with international agreements); Warren Newberry, Note,
Copyright Reform in China: A "TRIPS" Much Shorter and Less Strange than Imagined?, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2003) (explaining that China promulgated numerous
amendments to her copyright laws when she prepared tojoin the WTO).
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efforts to strengthen her IP protection laws, she has failed to
enforce these laws.4 The United States Trade Representative
("USTR") has identified China as having one of the least
developed and least effective IP regimes in the world.) China's
expansive patent docket illustrates her underdeveloped IP
system: over 4000 new patent infringement cases were filed
annually in China in 2007 and 2008.6
Piracy in China has cost IP owners worldwide an estimated
US$2.4 billion in 2007 alone.7 China continues to be one of the
world's largest producers of counterfeit goods, including films,
music, software, and pharmaceuticals, the last of which might
have the most harmful effects.8 In fact, China is one of the
world's biggest producers of counterfeit drugs.9 Counterfeit
4. See Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon Is Over: The US.-China W/TO Intellectual
Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT'l L.J. 96, 97 (2008) [hereinafter Harris, Honeymoon]
(arguing that despite adopting and implementing strong substantive IP laws, China has
failed to enforce these laws); Newberry, supra note 3 (claiming that China has not
enforced the new reformed copyright laws to meet international standards).
5. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE [USTR], 2009 SPECIAL
301 REPORT (2009), available at http://wmy.ustr.gov/sites/defailt/files/Full/
20Version%20ol/c20the%/" 202009%20SI)E(IHAL %20301 %20REIORT.pdf (declaring that
China's intellectual property rights ("IPR") enforcement regime remains ineffective);
Kimberly N. Van Voorhis & Christie Yang, Recent Developments in Patent Law Worldwide,
997 P.L.I. PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES, 405, 408 (2010) (stating that the USTR's Priority List has China as
having one of the least developed regimes).
6. See, e.g., Voorhis & Yang, supra note 5 (reporting that over 4000 patent
infringement suits were filed in 2008); Tony Chen & Mark Cohen, Real and Present
Danger: Patent Litigation in China, LAW 360, June 10, 2009, www.1aw360.com/articles/
105112 ("Over 4,000 new patent infringement cases were filed with Chinese courts in
each of 2007 and 2008."); Qian Huang & Paul Devinsky, China-Home and Away: The
Next IP Powerhouse, LAw 360, Oct. 21, 2009, http://-ww.mwe.com/info/pubs/
law360_102109.pdf (explaining that China had the biggest patent docket in the world in
2006 and that there were more than 4000 patent infringement cases filed in 2007).
7. See Harris, Honeymoon, supra note 4, at 102; INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ATlIlANCE, 2008 SPECIAl 301 RECOMMENDATION app. A, 1 (2008), available at
www .iipa.coim/pdf/2008SPEC301LOSSLEVEL.pdf (showing that the estimated losses
due to Chinese piracy was US$2.4 billion between 2006 and 2007).
8. See Shi, supra note 1, at 544 (stating that China is the largest producer of fake
goods); see also Chris Buckley, On Piracy, an Advocate for China's Progress, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/04/technology/04iht-
IPRjudge.html (stating that the US government warns against piracy of films, music,
software, and medicine in China).
9. See Bronhstein, supra note 2, at 439; Maria Nelson et al., Counterfeit
Pharmaceutical: A Worldwide Problem, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 1068, 1089 ("China remains
one of the world's largest sources of drugs, both legitimate and counterfeit.").
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pharmaceuticals pose serious health and economic dangers. 0
Previously, the penalties for counterfeit drugs were so minimal
that they were seen as business costs with little, if any, deterrent
effect." The ineffectiveness of the Chinese patent law and the
powerlessness of the central government to prevent patent
infringement have frustrated international litigants. 2 The
likelihood of winning a patent infringement suit against
counterfeit pharmaceutical producers is questionable, and
winning a patent infringement suit rarely stops counterfeiters
from continuing to infringe upon the winners' patents.' In
addition, international pharmaceutical patent holders face the
risk of having their patents invalidated upon petition by local
Chinese pharmaceutical companies.14 Recent developments and
changes to the Chinese patent law, however, might promise a
brighter future for international patent litigants.15 With the third
and most recent amendment to her patent law ("third
amendment"), China may be on her way to developing an
effective patent system.'6 China's lack of enforcement of its
amended patent law, however, might dim this promising glow.' 7
Part I of this Comment will discuss the development of the
Chinese IP system and discuss why it has been ineffective in
10. See Bronhstein, supra note 2, at 442 (explaining that counterfeit drugs pose
serious health and economic risks); Nelson et al., supra note 9, at 1072 (discussing the
hcalth and ccononic harms of counterfeit drugs). See generally Andrcw Marshall,
Prescription for Murder, 40 SMITHSONIAN 32 (2009) (discussing the deadly effects of
counterfeit drugs).
11. See Bronshtein, supra note 2, at 456 (" [S] uch low pcnalties arc oftcn considcred
a mere fscal speed bump in doing business."); Evelyn Iritani, China Pressed over Piracy:
The U.S. Asks the World Trade Organization to Make the Asian Nation Prove It Is Taking Action
to Stop Illegal Copying of Movies and Software, L.A. TIMLS, Oct. 27, 2005, at C1 ("[T]hc
penalties are often 'so light they just amount to a cost of doing business for those who
infringe.'").
12. See Harris, Honeymoon, supra notc 4, at 114-15 (explaining that the Unitcd
States filed a WTO complaint against China because of her inadequate IPR protection);
Iritani, supra note 11 (declaring that the USTR is facing increased pressure from US
busincss community over the amount of piracy of movies and software in China).
13. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (stating that the penalties for
infringement are so low that they are seen as a business expense).
14. See, e.g., infra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing how Chinesc
pharmaceutical companies tried to get Pizer's Viagra patent invalidated).
15. See infra Part IIC (discussing how the third amendment to the Chinese patent
law benefits international litigants).
16. See infra part JI.B (discussing the benefits of the third amendment).
17. See infra Part IG. I (explaining that the lack of enforcement casts doubt on the
cffectiveness of the third amendmncnt on patcnt protection).
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protecting pharmaceutical patents by comparing it to the US
patent system. Part II analyzes the third amendment to the
Chinese patent law and how it protects patents, particularly
pharmaceutical ones, and deters counterfeiters from infringing
upon the patents. Part II also presents different views on the
effectiveness of the third amendment to protect patents. Part III
argues that even though the third amendment is a great leap
forward, pharmaceutical counterfeiting will continue to happen
if the local governments do not cooperate with the central
government in enforcing patent protection laws.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHINESE PATENT LA WAND ITS
PROTECTION OF PATENTS PRIOR TO THE THIRD
AMENDMENT
Compared with her 5000 years of history, China's IP system
is relatively young.18 Historically, China was not particularly
receptive to IP rights, but she recognized that a developed IP
system was necessary to legitimatize herself as a major participant
in the global economy.'9 China's IP system has remained
remarkably different from that of the United States, which has
caused tension between the two countries.20 Part I is dedicated to
discussing and analyzing China's IP system, specifically her patent
law, and conveying why it is ineffective in protecting patents. Part
I first discusses the development of IP law in China and presents
the concerns that the United States has about China's IP laws and
details the structure of the Chinese patent law system. Second, it
discusses the difficulties that international litigants face when
suing for patent infringement in China. Last, Part I analyzes how
Chinese pharmaceutical companies are starting to use IP laws to
their own advantage.
18. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (stating that with the death of
iipcrialism in China in the early twentieth century, the need for IPR was grcat and an
IP law, albeit weak, was implemented in China).
19. See infra note 33 and accompanying text (articulating that Deng Xiaoping
thought a comprehensivc IP systcni would encourage investment froim abroad).
20. See infra Part 1.1 (discussing the tension between the United States and China
caused by the latter not meeting her WTO obligations); Part I.F (analy7ing the
diffcrcnccs betwecn the Chincse and US patcnt laws).
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A. Historical Background and Development of lP in China
China's underdeveloped IP system can be traced back to her
strict adherence to Confucian principles of sharing and
community commitment over individualism.21 Confucian beliefs
and the lack of formal laws in imperial China severely hampered
the development of IP rights.2 With the fall of imperial China
and the birth of a republican China, the need for patent laws was
inevitable.23 The first substantive national patent law was enacted
in 1912, but it offered little protection for patents and little
assurance to international patent holders in the Chinese
market.24 China's weak IP system was nearly abolished when the
Communist Party took over China in 194925 and instilled the
importance of communal success while disregarding
individualism.2 6 All inventions and innovations belonged to the
government, and as a result, property rights in patents were
21. See Alexander C. Chen, Climbing the Great Wall: A Guide to Intellectual Property
Enforcement in the People's Republic of China, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 9-10 (1997) (discussing how
China's adherence to Confucianism and Taoism thwarted development of her IIP
system); Raymond M. Gabriel, Comment, The Patent Revolution: Proposed Reforms in
Chinese Intellectual Property Law, Policy, and Practice Are the Latest Step to Bolster Patent
Protection in China, 9 AsIAN-PAC. IL. & POL'YJ. 323, 325-26 (2008) (explaining that the
idea of I1P is "alien to Chinese culture," which is focused on Confucianism and the
importance of communal success).
22. See Gabriel, supra note 21, at 326 (discussing that Conflucian principles and "the
absence of formal laws in Imperial China precipitated a lack of individual rights,
especially in intellectual property"). See generally Peter K. Yu, The Second Coming of
Intellectual Property Rights in China (Benjamin Cardozo School ofLaw Occasional Papers
in Intellectual Property Law No. 11, 2002), available at http://www.ischinalawyer.org/
filcs/articlcs/2dcoming.pdf (describing the factors that thwarted China from
developing effective IP laws).
23. Gabriel, supra note 21, at 326 (articulating that with the ending of Imperial
China, the need for IP laws became apparent); Yu, supra note 22, at 4-5 (discussing the
need for IPR in China in the twentieth century).
24. See Gabriel, supra note 21, at 326-27 (stating that the 1912 patent law offered
littic protection); Yu, supra note 22, at 6 (claiming that the 1912 patent law was
insufficient).
25. See Gabriel, supra note 21, at 326 (asserting that the rise of the Communist
Party in 1949 created great obstacles for IPR); see alsoYu, supra note 22, at 7 (articulating
that the prospects of I1P protection in China became "gloomier" when the Communists
took power in 1949).
26. See Gabricl, supra note 21, at 327-28 (noting that when the Communists took
power, they reinforced the importance of communal prosperity over individual rights);
see also Yu, supra note 22, at 21 ("Under the socialist economic system, property belongs
to the State and the people, rather than private owners.").
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completely abolished in 1963.27 The Cultural Revolution28
brought the development of the IP system to a complete stop. 9
The imprisonment of scientists, writers, and other intellectuals
who advocated individualism dissuaded people from claiming
individual rights to their ideas and inventions. 0 For the next
decade, China lacked a formal legal system, as previous laws were
renounced and local officials were allowed to influence the local
laws and court rulings.3'
When Deng Xiaoping succeeded Chairman Mao, he
initiated an ambitious program of economic and legal
development. 2 Recognizing that the development and
implementation of IP rights would attract foreign investment,
Chairman Deng focused on the enactment of a workable patent
system. 3 China joined the World Intellectual Property
27. PETER GANEA & THOMAS PATTLOCH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY lAW IN CHINA 3
(Christopher Heath ed., 2005); Gabriel, supra note 21, at 327-28.
28. The Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976, was a movement
inaugurated by Chairman Mao in an attempt to prevent the development of a
bureaucratized Soviet style of communism. During the Cultural Revolution, Chairman
Mao's government closed schools, persecuted Chinese teachers and other intellectuals,
burned books, and facilitated mass relocations of intellectuals to the countryside.
LOUTSE CHIPLEY SLAVICEK, THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 8-11 (2010).
29. See Gabriel, supra note 21, at 327 (" [T]he Cultural Revolution and the
destruction of China's legal system resulted in the complete halt of the development of
intellectual property laws."); see also Geoflrey T. Willard, An Examination of China's
Emerging Intellectual Property Regime: Historical Underpinnings, the Current System and
Prospects for the Future, 6 IND. INT'l & COMP. L. REV. 411, 417 (1996) (mentioning that
the Cultural Revolution halted the development of the I1P laws in China).
30. Cf Gabricl, supra note 21, at 327-28 ("The antipathy of individual intellectual
property rights to community rights was illustrated, at its extreme, by the imprisonment
of scientists, writers, artists, lawyers, and intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution.");
Yu, supra note 22, at 19 (describing how the Chinese government pcsecuted scientists,
writers, artists, lawyers, and intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution).
31. See Gabriel, supra note 21, at 328 (explaining that laws merely "implemented
Party policy and changed" as Party leadership changed and that "local officials had ...
influence over the rile of law through the People's Courts" and protected its local
citizens); see also Robert Bejesky, Investing in the Dragon: Managing the Patent Versus Trade
Secret Protection Decision for the lultinational Corporation in China, 11 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'l I. 439, 449 (describing how China is ruled by people, not laws, which has
consequential implications for 1 protection rights).
32. See Gabricl, supra note 21, at 328 ("When Deng Xiaoping resumed power ...
the Chinese government began an ambitious program of economic and legal reform.");
see also Willard, supra note 29, at 420-21 (describing Deng Xiaoping's program for
cconomic reform, which led to the creation of a comprehensive IP regime in China).
33. See Gabriel, supra note 21, at 328-29; see alo GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 27,
at 2-4 (describing how Deng Xiaoping thought a national patent system would
encourage overseas investment).
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Organization 34 ("WIPO") in 1980.15 In 1984, China enacted a
patent law that contained basic provisions, such as the subject
matter that patents can cover, how to file a patent, the
examination process of patents, and how patents should be
protected.t Nevertheless, it lacked the essential features
necessary to make it an effective and successful system.37 For
example, the 1984 Chinese patent law excluded patents for
inventions involving food, beverages, and pharmaceuticals.18 The
1984 law was amended in 1992 to cover pharmaceutical patents,
but it still offered little patent protection." The Chinese patent
law was subsequently amended in 2001 and again in 2008 in
attempts to make it more comprehensive and effective. 40
For the past two decades, China has tried to improve her
patent law, but the ever-expanding power and autonomy of local
governments have thwarted these efforts.41 In 2001, as part of her
34. World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") is a specialized agency of
the United Nations and promotes the protection of IP1 throughout the world through
cooperation among mnibcr states and in collaboration with other intcrinational
organizations. See What is WIPO?, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/
what is wipo.html (lastvisited Jan. 1, 2011).
35. See Bronshtcin, supra note 2, at 439-40 ("In 1980, China took initial significant
steps to improve its IP1 climate when it joined [WIPO]."); jordana Cornish, Cracks in the
Great Wall: Why China's Copyright Law Has Failed to Prevent Piracy ofAnerican Movies within
Its Borders, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 405, 414 (2006) (noting that China joincd WIPO
in 1980).
36. See generally Patent Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's
Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, cffective Mar. 12, 1984) (Lawinfochina) (China).
37. See Gabriel, supra note 21, at 330; see also Averie K. Hanson & Jean E.
Shimotake, Recent Developments in Patent Rights for Pharmaceuticals in China and India, 18
PACE INT'L L. REx. 303, 305-06 (2006).
38. See Gabriel, supra note 21, at 330; see also Hanson & Shimotake, supra note 37,
at 305-06.
39. See Gabriel, supra notc 21, at 331 (claiming that although the Chinesc patcnt
law was amended in 1992, it still did not offer adequate protection for patents); Yu, supra
note 22, at 10 (arguing that the 1992 amendment to the Chinese patent law "was not
cnough, cspccially when it was not propcrly implementcd").
40. See infra Part II.A-lB (discussing the second and third amendments and how
they made the Chinese patent law more effective and comprehensive).
41. See Bronshtcin, supra note 2, at 439 (commenting that although the Chinesc
government has tried to improve its patent protection system, "the growing power and
autonomy of local governments has complicated and exacerbated the problem [of
infringcmcnt]"); see also Jessica C. Wong, The Challenges Multinational Corporations Face in
Protecting Their Well-Known Tradenarks in China, 31 BROOK.J. INT'l L. 937, 964-76 (2006)
(arguing that local governmental protectionism, the lack of Judicial independence and
enforcement, and inadcquate mandatcd punishicnt led to wcak cnforceicnt of IPR).
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effort to tighten her IP law, China joined the WTO. 42 Due to
China's potential to quickly become an economic powerhouse,
the United States and European WTO member states demanded
that China have more obligations and fewer rights than other
members of the WTO. 43  In addition, the member states
substantially debated China's status as a developing country
because developing countries are afforded certain flexibilities
and benefits.45 China thus attempted to self-designate as a
developing country,46 but other members objected to this
designation, claiming that China received more foreign direct
investment than any other country and was the third-largest
trading nation and fourth-largest economy in the world.47 China
ultimately acceded as both a developing and developed country
(in IP matters, China acceded as a developed country) .48 China
was required to implement IP laws immediately instead of being
42. See Gabriel, supra note 21, at 332 (asserting that upon joining the WTO, "China
promised to bring its existing IP laws into closer alignment with the Trade-Rclatcd
Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement," which resulted in the
second amendment of the Chinese patent law); see also Harris, Honeymoon, supra note 4,
at 108 (asserting that China agreed to accede to the HTO after fifteen years of
negotiations).
43. See Marcia Don Harpaz, China and the WTO: New Kid on the Developing Bloc? 5
(Hebrew Univ. of.Jcrusalem, Research Paper No. 2-07, 2007), available at wwXw.ssrn.comf/
abstractid=961768 (listing the reduced rights and increased obligations that China had
compared to other WTO members).
44. See Harris, Honeymoon, supra note 4, at 110-11 (discussing the reasons China
was seen as a developed country); see also Harpa7, supra note 43, at I 1-12, 71 (discussing
the debates that WTO state members had over whether China should be considered a
developing country, being that she is the world's third-largcst trader and fourth-largcst
economy).
45. See Harris, Honeymoon, supra note 4, at 109-10 (explaining that if China
acceded as a developing country, she would be afforded the f1cxibilitics and benefits that
developing countries are typically given); see also Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke
Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 681, 687 (2006)
[hereinafter Harris, Carrying] (commenting that developing countries in the WT(O arc
aflorded more "flexibility in addressing social, economic, and political concerns").
46. See Harris, Honeymoon, supra note 4, at 110 (noting that China made numerous
attempts to accedc as a developing country); see also Harpaz, supra note 43, at 10
(asserting that China's formal application to the WTO stressed that she was a developing
country).
47. See sources cited supra note 44.
48. See Harris, Honeymoon, supra note 4, at 111 (reporting that in some areas, China
acceded as a developing country and in others, such as countervailing duties, she
acceded as a developed country); see also Harpaz, supra note 43, at 14 (quoting China's
chief negotiator during her accession to the WTO, saying that China will insist on
undertaking obligations that are consistent with her status as a developing country); id.
at 9-44 (discussing the details of China's accession to the WTO and her obligations).
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given the five-year grace period afforded developing countries. 49
Much optimism surrounded China's accession, but
disappointment and frustration lay ahead.5 1o
B. China's Patent Law Structure
China implemented a set of legal mechanisms to prevent
patent infringement, but the enforcement of IP laws is
insufficient. In China, either administrative or adjudicative
mechanisms can be used to enforce IP laws through both civil
and criminal suits. 51 Such mechanisms, however, are often
ineffective against pharmaceutical counterfeiting.5 2  The
administrative mechanism is one method commonly used to
handle pharmaceutical patent infringement cases.5 3 The State
Intellectual Property Office ("SIPO") is responsible for granting
and enforcing patents.54 Enforcement includes investigating,
mediating, imposing fines, and providing cease-and-desist orders
through provisional offices and agencies.55 Patent holders can
request an administrative investigation for possible infringement
49. See Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, pt. I, §
2(A)(2), WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) (mandating that China implement JI) laws
immediately at the central and local government levels); Harris, Honeymoon, sapra note
4, at 112.
50. See Harris, Honeymoon, supra note 4, 113 (noting that optimism about China's
1PR enforcement was misplaced); see also ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 202 (2005) (arguing that China's
inability to deter future counterfeiters is a major sign of her lack of anti-counterfeiting
enforcement).
51. See Bronshtein, supra note 2, at 452 ("In China, [IP] laws arc enforced either
through an administrative mechanism or through adjudication, including both civil and
criminal action."). See generally Intellectual Property Rights: Toolkit, EMBASSY OF US: BEIJING,
CHINA, http://bcijing.uscmbassy-china.org.cn/protccting ipr.htil (last visited Jan. 1,
2011) [hereinafter IPR Toolkit] (discussing how the IPR enforcement system works in
China).
52. See infra Part II.D (discussing why the administrative and adjudicative
mechanisms are ineffective against deterring patent infringement).
53. See Bronshtein, supra note 2, at 452; see also JPR Toolkit, supra note 51 (stating
that China's State Drug Administration handles counterfeit pharmaccutical cases).
54. See Bronshtein, supra note 2, at 453 (indicating that SIPO is responsible for
enforcing patents and discussing the means it takes to enforce patents); see also
Intellectual Property Rights: Patent, EMBASSY OF US: BEIJING, CHINA,
http://beiiing.usembassy-china.org.cn/iprpatent.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011)
[hereinafter JPR: Patent] (listing the responsibilities of SIPO).
55. See sources cited supra note 54 (listing the powers and responsibilitics of SIPO).
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activity by filing such a request in the local SIPO office.5 6 Upon
the proper finding, the patent administrative authority can order
an infringer to cease immediately.5 7 If an infringer does not
agree with the order, he has fifteen days after receiving the order
to file an appeal in court.58 There is a two-year statute of
limitations to file a patent infringement suit, and time starts
when the patentee becomes aware of the patent infringement 9
If suit is brought within the statute of limitations and the
infringement is deemed criminal, the infringer would also be
investigated for criminal liability.'
SIPO also has the power to enjoin the infringer from
manufacturing, order the destruction of the infringing products,
and confiscate the machinery used to make the counterfeit
goods.6' Often, however, infringers just receive a monetary
penalty, which cannot be given to the patentees, thus leaving
them without any compensation.62 In addition, many local SIPO
offices lack the financial means and motivation to train staff to
56. See IPR: Patent, supra note 54 (explaining that requests for an investigation of
potentially infringing behavior begins at SIPO office).
57. Patent Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., Mar.
12, 1984, amended Aug. 25, 2000) (Lawinfochina), art. 57 (China) [hereinafter 2000
Patent Law] ("Where the authorities for patent work considers the infringement well
found, it has the power to order the infringer to stop infringement acts immediately.").
58. Id. ("In case the party concerned is not satisfied with the decision, he or it may,
within 15 (lays from the receipt of the notification of the order, institutes [sic] legal
proceedings in the people's court, according to the Administrative Procedure Law of the
People's Republic of China.").
59. Id. art. 62 ("Prescription for instituting legal proceedings concerning the
infringement of patent right is two years counted from the date on which the patentee
or any interested party obtains or should have obtained knowledge of the infringing
act.").
60. Id. art. 58 ("Where the infringement constitutes a crime, he shall be prosecuted
for his criminal liability.").
61. See Bronshtcin, supra note 2, at 453-54; Gerald Hanc, Intellectual Property and
Innovation in China, SC. & TRADE POL Y PROGRAM (Aug. 2008), http://gallery.ida.org/
chinaforum/forum/ipinnovation.html ("SAIC [State Administration on Industry and
Commerce] has the power to order that the sale of infringing items cease and to stop
further infringement, order the destruction of infringing marks or products, impose
fines, and remove machines used to produce counterfeit goods.").
62. Bronshtcin, supra note 2, at 454 (discussing that administrative agencies cannot
award compensation to patent holders in most cases, leaving "[t]he harmed infringee,
who may have suffered great financial harm due to the infringement, without any
monetary redress"); Hane, supra note 61 (indicating that some of "the disadvantages of
the administrative process include the lack of [monetary] compensation" to the
infringee); see also IPR Toolkit, supra note 51 (stating that administrative agencies cannot
award compensation to an IPR holder).
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enforce the cease-and-desist orders: local governments provide
the financing for administrative agencies, and may be hesitant to
provide such funding if pharmaceutical counterfeiting is a large
part of the local economy.@ Agencies are also reluctant to
forward patent infringement cases to the criminal authorities
because doing so runs counter to the local government's
wishes.64
Because of the complexity of patent infringement disputes,
the adjudicative mechanism is used more often than the
administrative mechanism. 5 There are four levels in China's
judicial system: (1) the Basic People's Court; (2) the
Intermediate People's Court; (3) the Higher People's Court; and
(4) the Supreme People's Court.t' The highest court, the
Supreme People's Court, has assigned about fifty courts to be
first-instance courts for adjudication of patent infringement.>7
63. 11ronshtein, supra note 2, at 454 (asserting that the administrative mechanism is
"not very effective due to the shortage of available financial resources and trained stall
to carry out enforcement," mainly due to local government's reluctance to fund local
SIPOs); Andrew Evans, Taming the Counterfeit Dragon: The WTO, TRIPS and Chinese
Amendments to Intellectual Property Laws, 31 GA.J. INT'l COMP. L 587, 591 (2003) (stating
that local governments are often reluctant to provide funding to enable administrative
agencies to operate because they benefit financially from the pirating and
counterfeiting); see also Wong, supra note 41, at 965, 967 (illustrating that administrative
enforcement efforts arc hindered by a lack of funding from local government).
64. See 11ronshtein, supra note 2, at 454 (articulating that administrative authorities
are reluctant to forward IPR infringement cases to the criminal authorities); see also
Trade with China: Hearing on U.S. Trade with China Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, I 10th Cong. (2007) (statement of Geralyn Ritter, Vice
President, International Affairs Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
Association) (stating that patent infringement cases often arc not tried for criminal
liability, resulting in very few criminal sanctions).
65. See Hlane, supra note 61 ("Patent disputes remain the most likely of intellectual
property right disputes to be adjudicated, due in large part of their relative
complexity."); IPR: Patent, supra note 54.
66. See Benjamin lBai et al, What Multinational Companies Need to Know about Patent
Invalidation and Patent Litigation in China, 5 Nw.J. INT'L TLCH. & INTELL. PROP. 449, 457
(2007); Donald C. Clarke, The Chinese Legal System, GEO. WASH. U. L. SCH. (July 4, 2005),
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dclarke/public/Chinesel egalSystem.html.
67. See Bai et al., supra note 66, at 458 ("Because of the complexity of patent cases,
the Supreme People's Court has designated about 50 courts (mostly Intermediate
People's Courts) around the country to be lirst-instance courts for adludication of
patent infringement claims."); Chcng Young-Shun, Comment, Juridical Protection of
Intellectual Property in China, 9 DKFJ. COMP. & INT'l, L. 267, 271 (1998) ("The Supreme
People's Court has assigned forty-three of the 400 Intermediate People's Courts in
China to serve as courts of first instance for patent infringement cases.").
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The method used to determine whether infringement has
occurred is very basic.68 There is no analog to a Markman
hearing69 for claim construction in China as there is the in the
United States; during trial, the analysis of the claim might last
between half a day and several days.? Chinese courts have not
developed sophisticated construction methods to guide the
determination of infringement and cannot use case law as
guidelines.7' In addition, "plaintiffs must collect and submit their
own evidence to meet their burden of proof regarding ... patent
infringement and damages."72  Chinese courts only accept
evidence in its original form and will sometimes allow evidence
obtained from previous administrative or preliminary injunction
proceedings.73 Certain evidence collected outside of China must
be notarized in the originating country and then authenticated
by the applicable Chinese embassy or consulate. 74
C. The Tension and Distrust between the United States and China
The United States gave China between 2001 and 2005 to
develop and implement IP laws by not immediately filing a
complaint with the WTO against China, despite the United
68. See infra notes 70-71 (discussing the simplicity of the adjudicative process of
patent infringement cases in China).
69. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (holding
that before a patent infringement case goes to a jury, th judge must construe, as matter
of law, the claims of the relevant patent); see also Richard Raysman & Peter Brown,
'Markman' Hearings and Computer Terms, N.Y. I .J., Feb. 10, 2004, at I (describing
Markman hearings as prc-trial proceedings "in which the trial judgc is presented with
evidence to construe the key terms in the patent claims").
70. Benjamin lai et al., How to Litigate Patents in China, 5 CHINA I1) FOcUS 3, 5
(2007) ("There is no US-stylc, pre-trial Markman hearing for claim construction. Claim
construction and infringement analysis occur at trial, which might last between half a
day and a couple of days.").
71. See Bai et al., supra note 66, at 461 (commenting that Chinese courts have yet to
elaborate on canons of construction to determine infringement and that China is not a
common-law jurisdiction); Laurie Self & Jason Ma, Amending China's Trademark Law: A
Discussion of the Possible Changes to Trademark Law in China, 218 TRADELMARK WORLD 18,
20 (2009) (mentioning that case law in China is not binding on lower courts).
72. Bai et al., supra note 66, at 459; see also Shun, supra note 67, at 269 (" [T]he
complainant can file criminal suit in his own name if he presents sufficient evidence that
the defendant had infringed his intellectual property rights.").
73. Civil Procedure Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's
Cong., Oct. 28, 2007) (Lawinfochina), art. 68 (China) [hereinafter Chinese Civil
Procedure Law] (stating that all documents must be in their original form to be
submitted into evidence).
74. See id. art. 67.
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States' apparent belief that the Chinese IP laws were
unacceptable.75 The United States became so wary and frustrated
by China's lack of progress that in 2006 it established the China
Enforcement Task Force to prepare WTO cases against China.7 1
The Chinese Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's
Procuratorate tried to ameliorate some of the frustration and
dissatisfaction by issuing a decision that permitted a lower
standard for IPR prosecution and increased the penalties for
infringement, but the United States was still not satisfied.77 The
United States complained that China's criminal law did not
sufficiently deter would-be infringers and did not order the
disposal of infringing goods.7 8
Pressured by the United States, China promised to conform
her existing IP laws to the guidelines laid out in the WTO's
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS")
agreement."1 The TRIPS agreement, however, only established
the minimum baseline for IP protection and is not self-
executing."1 The TRIPS agreement also allowed the member
75. See Harris, Honeymoon, supra note 4, at 114 (mentioning that between 2001 and
2005, the United States gave China time to implement its WTO IP obligations, but China
was slow to do so). See generally USTR, Fact Sheet: WTO Case Challenging Weaknesses in
China's Legal Regime for Protection, Enforcement of Copyrights, Trademarks, U.S. FED. NE'S,
Apr. 9, 2007, available at 2007 WILNR 6947235 (discussing the weaknesses of the Chinese
IP) systemi).
76. See Harris, Honeymoon, supra note 4, at 114; see also USTR, U.S.-CHINA TRADE
RELATIONS: ENTERING A NEW PHASE OF GREATER ACCOUNTABILYFY AN) ENFORCEMENT 5
(2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/defaultfiles/Top-to-lHottom/" 20Review%"
20FINAL.pdf (asserting that the United States attempted to ensure China's compliance
with trade obligations by establishing a China Enforcement Task Force).
77. See Harris, Honeymoon, supra note 4, at 114 ("The United States considered this
a good but inadequate step."); see also USTR, supra note 75 (recognizing the importance
of the decision, but arguing that a major safe harbor was still available for
counterfeiters).
78. See Harris, Honeymoon, supra note 4, at 115 (listing the complaints that the
United States had alleged against China in its WTO complaint); Requests for
Consultations by the United States, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 10, 2007) [hereinafter
Consultations] (discussing all the complaints the United States had against China).
79. See Gabriel, supra note 21, at 332 (mentioning that China promised to align its
patent laws more closely with the TRIPS agreement); Harris, Honeymoon, supra note 4, at
101 (discussing how the United States pushed for China to become a party to the TRIPS
agreement).
80. Agreement on Trade-Rclatcd Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, art.
3 n.3, 108 Stat. 4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] ("For the
purposes of Article 3 and 4, 'protection' shall include matters affecting the availability,
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states some flexibility in interpreting and implementing the
agreement into their domestic legislation.8'
In sum, China's IP laws have created a troubled relationship
with the United States, which has grown increasingly suspicious
of China's devotion to IP protection. The United States has
continuously complained that China is not fulfilling her WTO
obligations, but to no avail.
D. China's Ineffective Penalties for Patent Infringement
Before the third amendment to the Chinese patent law, civil
penalties were also ineffective in deterring counterfeiters82-
courts could not impose damages exceeding CNY500,000 (about
US$62,500)." The number of patent infringement civil
proceedings, however, has steadily risen in China.8 4 Chinese
patent law set the ceiling for fines at three times the infringer's
income,8 5 and both the patentee's losses and infringer's profits
acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well
as those matters aflecting the use of intellectual property rights specifcally addressed in
this Agreement."); see also Jacob A. Schroeder, So Long as You Live Under My Roof You'll
Live by .1.h. ose Rules?: Ending the Extraterritorial Application of Patent Law, 18 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 55, 66 (2009) (stating that the TRIPS agreement provides its members
some flexibility to implement their TRIPS agreement obligations).
81. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 80, art. 1 ("Members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement
within their own legal system and practice."); see also Schroeder, supra note 80, at 66
("The TRIPS agreement establishes minimum, baseline intellectual property
protection.").
82. See supra note II and accompanying text (mentioning that the fines are so low
that they are just seen as a business cost).
83. See Trademark Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, amended Oct. 27, 2001) (Lawinfochina), art. 56 (China),
[hereinafter Trademark Law] ("If ... it is difficult to determine the losses suffered by
the infringed due to the infringement[,] the people's court shall determine a
compensation of 500,000 Yuan or below according to the circumstances of the
infringing acts."); infra note 172 (discussing the maximum fines that the Chincse patent
law allowed after the third amendment).
84. See Bronshtein, supra note 2, at 455 (asserting that the number of civil
proceedings dealing with IP infringement have been increasing); see also Jiang Zhipci,
Recent Developments in China's Judicial Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Address at
Temple University Law School (Aug. 18, 2008), available at http://wmy.chinaiprlaw.
com/nglish/forum/forum43.htm (citing that the number of IP infringement civil
cases has increased from 5200 in 2001 to 7800 in 2002).
85. 2000 Patent Law, supra note 57, art. 58 (providing that an infringer "may be
coupled with a fine of no more than 3 times of his illegal income").
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are used to calculate damages. 86 The amount of damages also
includes the expenses incurred by the patentee to stop the
infringement.87 While these are the maximum limits for fines,
actual fines given in infringement cases are much lower,
averaging below US$800.88 The courts do not take into account
the ability of infringers to make gigantic profits on the
counterfeit products nor the severity of harm that the product
can cause to the public. 9
Even though China had implemented criminal procedure
and penalties for IP infringement, she rarely enforced them."o In
2002, the courts had convicted infringers in less than one
percent of the counterfeiting cases that administrative agencies
had handled.' Under Chinese laws, criminal prosecution will
only be pursued "[ilf the circumstances are serious."92 This
statutory language gives courts wide discretion, which is
sometimes abused, especially when local governments pressure
judges to overlook the infringement.93 Furthermore, even when
86. Id. art. 60 ("The amount of damages for infringing a patent right shall be
calculated according to the losses suffered by the patentee or the profits gained by the
infringer out of the infringement.").
87. Trademark Law, supra note 83, art. 56 (providing that the infringee should be
compensated for "the losses suffered ... due to the infringement during the period of
being infringed, including the reasonable expenses paid by the infringed to stop the
infringing acts").
88. See Counterfeiting in China: Roundtable on Intellectual Property Protection as Economic
Policy: Will China Ever Enforce Its IP Laws? Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm. on China,
109th Cong. (May 16, 2005) (statement of Daniel Chow, professor, Ohio State University
Michael E. Moritz College of Law), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pagcs/
roundtables/051605 /Chow.php?PHPSESSIlDdl 070115 6c60debc015 f al9a5733202
[hereinafter Chow] (reporting that the average line was US$794 in 2000).
89. See Bronshtcin, supra note 2, at 456; Jayanthi Iycngar, Intellectual Property Piracy
Rocks China Boat, ASTA TIMES, Sept. 16, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/
FIl I 6Ad07.html (arguing that piracy in China flourished because of high returns and low
punishment).
90. See supra note 64 (discussing how infringers are rarely criminally prosecuted).
91. See Chow, supra note 88 ("[In 2000, only about I in every 500 infringement
cases were referred to judicial authorities for criminal prosecutions."); Timothy P.
Trainer, The Fight against Trademark Counterfeiting, CHINA BiUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at
20, 22 ("Between January and May 2002, the criminal tribunals of the People's Courts
convicted only 187 trademark infringers. This number represents far less than one
percent of the tens of thousands of counterfeiting cases that the administrative
authorities dealt with during the same period.").
92. 2000 Patent Law, supra note 57, art. 64.
93. See USTR, 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2006), available at http://ustraderep.gov/
assets/ )ocuimentLibrary/ ReportsPublications/ 2006/ 2006_Special 301 Review/
asset upload filc473_9336.pdf ("China has thus maintained a legal 'safe harbor' that
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patent infringers are found criminally liable, the maximum
sentence permitted under the law is three years if "circumstances
are serious" and between three and seven years if the
infringement is of "a more serious nature."9' This language again
allows the courts to use a wide range of discretion.K In addition,
because local legislatures have the power to enact local IPR
protection rules and do not communicate with each other about
these rules, rules are inconsistent among localities.9@
E. The Differences between the Chinese and US Patent Law
The US patent law system differs remarkably from China's
and many other nations' systems. 7 Several major differences
between US and Chinese patent law include patent priority,
grace periods, prior user rights, and the best-mode
requirement.98 Regarding patent priority, the United States
protects a large group of commercial infringers and operates to deprive the criminal
enforcement authorities of needed information regarding the sources of counterfeit
and pirated goods."); Bronshtein, supra note 2, at 457 (arguing that the flexibility of the
statutory language and the prcssurc that judgcs receive from local governments prevents
them from imposing criminal sanctions); see also Omari Kanji, Note, Paper Dragon:
Inadequate Protection ofIntellectual Property Rights in China, 27 MICH.J. INT'l, L. 1261, 1275
(2006) ("Article 59 allows prosecution of pirates where the case is 'so serious as to
constitute a crime,' which simultaneously implies that I1P piracy and criminality can be
mutually exclusive and fails to establish a threshold for criminality.").
94. Criminal Law Provisions of Intellectual Property Criic (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., July 1, 1979, amended Mar. 14, 1997)
(Lawinfochina), arts. 215-16 (China) [hereinafter Criminal Law].
95. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (explaining that courts are afforded
discretion in deciding whether infringers should be held criminally liable).
96. See Bronshtein, supra note 2, at 458 ("Because local people's congresses have
the power to promulgate new laws and rcgulations to address IPR, and there is no
formal communication system between the various Chinese localities, the applicable law
is often inconsistent and ambiguous."); Jessica jiong Zhou, Trademark Law &
Enforcement in China: A Transnational Perspective, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 415, 435-36 (2002)
(arguing that China is very decentralized, leading to confision about applicable laws
and lax enforcement at the local level).
97. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32996,
PATENT REFORM: INNOVATION IssUES 8 (2005) (claiming that there are several notable
distinctions between the US patent law and those of her leading trading partners); Ryan
M. Corbett, Note, Harmonization of U.S. and Foreign Patent Law and H.R. 2795: The Patent
Reform Act of 2005, 18 FIA.j. INT'l L. 717, 718 (2006) (illustrating that there are several
aspects of US patent law that differ from the patent laws of many other nations).
98. See Corbett, supra note 97, at 719-22 (2006) (detailing the five major
differences between foreign and US patent law); Robert R. Willis, International Patent
Law: Should United States and Foreign Patent Laws Be Uniform? An Analysis of the Benefits,
Problems, and Barriers, 10 N.C.J. L. & TECH. 283, 293 (2009).
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employs a first-to-invent systemt9 while China, like most other
nations, uses a first-to-file system."' In the United States, when
two independent inventors file patent applications for the same
invention at the same time, the patent will be granted to the
applicant who can prove he was the first to invent the device.""
In contrast, a first-to-file system grants the patent to the first
person to file for the patent. 0 2 Unlike courts in first-to-invent
systems, courts that operate in a first-to-file system do not need to
address problems of burden of proof or examine supporting
evidence to determine which litigant has priority because
ownership of a patent is controlled by the date of filing.o10
Pursuant to the United States Code, an applicant is
prohibited from obtaining a patent on an invention that was
described in a printed publication within or outside of the
United States, or was in public use or on sale in the United States
more than one year prior to the date of the filing in the United
States.1 4 The US patent system provides inventors with a grace
period during which they are allowed to publicize, and even
commercialize, their inventions without surrendering their rights
to patent their inventions. 105 In China, a publication or disclosure
of an invention or similar invention results in the rejection of the
patent.10 i For example, GlaxoSmithKline was forced to abandon
one of the claims for its anti-diabetic drug Avandia because
99. See Peter A. Jackman, Adoption of a First-to-File Patent System: A Proposal, 26 U.
BALT. L. REv. 67, 67 (1997); see also Willis, supra note 98, at 293.
100. 2000 Patent Law, supra note 57, art. 9 ("Where two or more applicants filc
applications for patent for the identical inventon-creation, the patent right shall be
granted to the applicant whose application was filed first.").
101. See Corbett, supra note 97, at 719; Willis, supra notc 98, at 293.
102. See Corbett, supra note 97, at 723; Willis, supra note 98, at 296.
103. See Willis, supra note 98, at 296; see also Jackman, supra note 99, at 74
(reasoning that bccause courts in first-to-filc systems only have to worry about the date of
filing, they do not normally have to look at any prior dates of conception).
104. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ...
the invcntion was patcnted or described in a printcd publication in this or a foreign
country or in the public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the
date of application for patent in the United States.").
105. See id.; see also Willis, supra notc 98, at 296 ("A grace pcriod provides a limitcd
period of time to the applicant in which he or she may introduce the patent to the
public or commercial spotlight without forfeiting the right to obtain a patent.").
106. See 2000 Patent Law, supra note 57, art. 23 ("Any design for which patcnt right
may be granted must not be identical with or similar to any design which, before the
date of filing, has been publicly disclosed in publications in the country or abroad or has
been publicly used in the country.").
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Chinese plaintiffs sought to invalidate the patent, claiming the
patent covered information that had been previously published
and was available to the public. 07
Litigants in a first-to-file system can use prior-user rights as a
defense in limited situations.108 For example, in some
circumstances, prior users can assert, as a defense, a previous
commercial use of the patent or a significant preparation for
such a use before the filing date of the application."19 Prior-user
rights do not function as a defense in first-to-invent systems
because they allow the first inventor to invalidate patents that
were issued to later inventors. 110 In first-to-file systems that allow
prior users defenses, prior users will be allowed a limited use of
the patent if they can establish sufficient pre-filing activity. '
The United States has also adopted the best-mode
requirement, which mandates that an applicant disclose the best
method for executing the invention.112 Hence, the inventor
107. See Jeffrey A. Andrews, Pfizer's Viagra Patent and the Promise of Patent Protection in
China, 28 LOv. L.A. INT'l & COMP. IL. REV. 1, 18 (2006); see also Phelim Kyne & Leslie
Chang, Glaxo Gives Up Chinese Patent Amid Drug Makers' Challenge, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19,
2004, at 116 (reporting that GlaxoSmithKline decided to abandon a defense of its
formulation for rosiglitazone because three Chinese makers of generic drugs claimed
that some of the novcl clcincuts of Avandia covcrcd by GlaxoSinithKlinc's patent had
already been published in the public domain before GlaxoSmithKline filed the patent).
108. Willis, supra note 98, at 297; see Vito j. Dellari, Note, International
Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed Solution to the United States' First-to-File Debate, 16
FORDHAM INT'l L.J. 687, 700 (1993).
109. Willis, supra note 98, at 297; see I)eBari, supra note 108, at 700.
110. See DcBari, supra notc 108, at 700-01 ("In a first-to-filc systcin, howeycr,
priority is based on the 1iling of the patent application. Thus, without a prior user right,
a prior user is unable to continue using the independently developed invention if
somcone clse obtains a patcnt for the sanic invention."); Willis, supra notc 98, at 297
(" [A] prior user rights provision attempts to provide an equitable solution for first-to-file
situations that the first-to-invent system naturally provides for.").
111. DeBari, supra note 108, at 701 ("With a prior uscr right, if prior users can
establish sufficient pre-filing activity, they will be permitted to continue such use despite
the presence of another's patent, subject to specific limitations on the extent of that
usc."); see ADVISORY COMM'N ON PATENT LAw\ RLEORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY 01
COMMERCE 11 (1992) (proposing that the United States adopt a first-to-file system in
which a limited prior user right should apply, which "right should be cast as a limited
equitablc defensc to a claim of infringcincnt that would be available only to those who
had used or made substantial preparation for use of the patented invention prior to the
filing date of a subsequently issued patent.").
112. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("The specification shall ... set forth the best modc
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention."); see Willis, supra note 98, at
298 ("The 'best mode requirement' mandates that an applicant must disclose the best
method contcmplatcd for carrying out the invcntion.").
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cannot submit an inferior version of his invention and keep the
best version to himself."3 Patents can be invalidated if they do
not comply with the best-mode requirement.114 To determine
whether this requirement is fulfilled, US courts use a two-
pronged test that asks: (1) whether at the time of filing, the
inventor actually had a best mode in mind, and (2) if he did,
whether the written description disclosed the best mode in a way
that someone skilled in the ordinary art could replicate the best
mode. 115 If the inventor does not know of a best mode at the time
of filing, he is exempted from disclosing this information and the
patent will be valid.1'o
The Chinese standards are much stricter. Under the
Chinese patent law, the applicant is required to disclose enough
information to enable a person skilled in the relevant field of
technology to understand and exploit the invention accordingly
and requires the patent to describe "in detail the optimally
selected mode contemplated by the applicant for carrying out
the invention or utility model."" 7 SIPO most likely invalidated
Pfizer's Viagra patent because it disclosed sildenafil citrate along
with eight other ingredients as the "most preferred ingredients"
and it was not descriptive enough under the Chinese patent
113. Willis, supra note 98, at 298; see Corbett, supra note 98, at 722 ("Allowing the
inventor to disclose an inferior version of the invention while keeping the best
embodiment a secret[] goes against the disclosure goals of patent law.").
114. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (asserting that a patent application's written specification
"shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention"); see also jeanne C. Fromer, The Compatibility of Patent Law and the Internet, 78
FoRDHAM1 L. REx. 2783, 2788 ("Patents are granted after successfully undergoing an
examination by the Patent and Trademark Office to ascertain that an invention meets
patentability conditions and its description in the patent application satisfies specified
disclosure requireints of a written description, cnablcincnt, and best mode.").
115. See, e.g., TAL tech Ltd. v. Esquel Apparel, Inc., 279 Fed. Appx. 974, 977 (Fed.
(ir. 2008) (applying the two-pronged test); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 251 F.3d
955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
116. See Benger Labs. Ltd. v. R.K. ILaros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639, 644 (E.). pa. 1962)
(holding that a failure to disclose the best method does not invalidate a patent if the
patent holder did not know it or appreciate that it was the best method); see also
Engelhard Industries, Inc. v. Sel-Rex Corp., 253 F. Supp. 832, 837 (D.N.J. 1966) (citing
Benger Labs, 209 F. Supp. at 644).
117. Implcmcnting Regulations of the Patent Law of the People's Republic of
China (promulgated by the State Council of the People's Republic of China, June 15,
2001, amended Jan. 9, 2010), available at http://www.ccpit-patent.com.cn//nting
RcgulationsPatcntLawChina.htm.
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law." 8 US law does not mandate a detailed description of the
optimally selected model. 9
Another difference is that the United States Code permits
judges to award the prevailing party attorney's fees in exceptional
cases. 120 Exceptional cases have been limited to those in which a
party is guilty of litigation misconduct, which includes vexatious,
unjustified, and otherwise bad litigation, a frivolous suit, or
willful infringement.'2' The Chinese patent law, however, does
not punish parties for conducting bad faith litigation.122 Thus, it
is possible for some bad faith actors to apply for patents for prior
arts or designs and immediately sue others for infringing their
patents once they obtain them.'2 3
118. See Andrews, supra note 107, at 27. See generally Iizhu Zheng, Invalidation
Decision of Viagra Patent Revoked in China, CASRIP NFWsL., Spring/Summer 2006,
available at http://ww.lawN .washington.cdu/Casrip/Ncwslctter/dcfault.aspx?year=
2006&article newsyl3i2Zheng (describing the reasons why the Viagra patent was
invalidated).
119. 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(b) (2005). This statute expands upon the "bcst mode"
requirement laid out in 35 U.S.C. § 112 by stating:
The specification must set forth the precise invention for which a patent is
solicited, in such manncr as to distinguish it from other invcntions and from
what is old. It must describe completely a specific embodiment of the process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter or improvement invented, and
must cxplain the mode of opcration of principlc whcncyer applicable.
Id.
120. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2010) ("The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorncy fecs to prevailing party.").
121. See Epcon Gas System, Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1035
(6th Cir. 2002) (holding that an attorney's failure to conduct a thorough investigation
into an infringement claim, basing all allcgations on rumors, is insufficient to dccim the
case exceptional, and that a reward of attorney's fees should not be granted); Hoffman-
La Roche Inc. v. Invadmed Inc., 213 F.3d 1359, 1365 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a case
in which the plaintiff suspected infringeincnt and madc reasonablc cfforts to
substantiate his claims does not fall under the exceptional case rule); Beckman
Instruments, Inc. v. LKlI Produkter All, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding
that a dcfcndant's litigation strategy of plcading irrclevant defenses that rcquircd
lengthy defense and repeated violation of temporary injunctions constituted vexatious
litigation).
122. See Xiaoqing Fcng, The Interaction between Enhancing the Capacity for Independent
Innovation and Patent Protection: A Perspective on the Third Amendment to the Patent Law of
the P.R. China, 9 U. PITT. j. TECH. IL. & poL'Y 1, 126-27 (2009) (" [S]ome illegal actors
will makc use of [the patcnt system] to apply for patent for the knowingly prior art or
design, and immediately accuse others of infringing upon his patent rights after he has
obtained patent right.").
123. See id.
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F. The Difficulties that International Litigants Face when Pursuing a
Patent Infringement Case in China
The Chinese patent law advises parties to try to solve patent
disputes through negotiation before pursuing legal or
administrative proceedings.124 Because Chinese courts do not
mandate or provide for a formal discovery process, some lawyers
opt for the use of the administrative process to establish
infringement, appreciative of its speed and usefulness in
gathering evidence.12  As mentioned above, however,
administrative agencies lack funding and impose low fines for
infringers. 126 In addition, they often refuse to initiate an
investigation due to local protectionism and corruption.'27
International litigants who collect their evidence in their home
country must get the evidence notarized, and translated before it
is admissible in court. 128 Another factor dissuading filing civil
actions is the unequal treatment of the parties.12 9 Civil cases are
supposed to be handled within six months of the filing date.1s0
International parties, however, are not protected by this law, and
124. 2000 Patent Law, supra note 57, art. 57 ("The authoritics for patent work may,
upon the request of the parties concerned, mediate on the damages concerned. If
mediation does not work, the parties concerned may lodge a lawsuit with the people's
court according to the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China.").
125. See Bai et al., supra note 66, at 459 ("Because there is no U.S.-style discovery
process in China, plaintiffs must collect and submit their own evidence."); The Patent
Law of the People's Republic of China, LADAS & PARRY LLP, http://www.ladas.com/Patents/
P'atentPractice/ChinaPatentl aw/index.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2011) (reporting that
China has no discovery procedure in which documents must be given to the opposing
side).
126. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (arguing that because of local
corruption, SIPO often does not have the funding to enforce the patent law and is
pressured into imposing low fines for patent infringement).
127. See Bronshtein, supra note 2, at 459 ("Insufficient enforcement of the law,
caused by the local governmental protectionism of drug counterfeiting, has arguably
decreased even the low deterrent effect that current legal mechanisms provide."); see
also Wong, supra note 41, at 964-72 (claiming that local governmental protectionism
along with inadequate penalties have led to poor IPR enforcement).
128. Chinese Civil Procedure Law, supra note 73, art. 68-68.
129. See, e.g., Wong, supra note 41, at 968 (mentioning that patent infringement
cases filed by foreign litigants are adjudicated much more slowly than those filed by
domestic litigants).
130. Chinese Civil Procedure Law, supra note 73, art. 135 ("A people's court shall
complete the adjudication of a case to which ordinary procedure is applied within six
months after the case is accepted.").
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it might be several years before their cases are adjudicated.' 3'
Even if international parties initiate a suit, they face many
difficulties partly because the problems of protectionism and
corruption also contribute to the unlikelihood of international
parties winning a patent infringement case in Chinese courts.
G. Recent Developments in China's Pharmaceutical Industry Are
Changing the Perspective on IP Law
PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated that China's
pharmaceutical industry was worth US$28.2 billion in 2000;112 the
industry netted sales of US$7.5 billion in 2004.13s In recent years,
China's pharmaceutical industry has continuously grown in both
profits and size, largely due to the central government's funding
of the industry's development and research.134
With increasing funding and profits, Chinese
pharmaceutical companies that were originally built to pirate
patented pharmaceuticals are beginning to manipulate the IP
laws to their own advantage. 35 For example, during the
beginning of the new millennium, Chinese plaintiffs petitioned
SIPO to invalidate several US pharmaceutical giants' drug
patents. On September 19, 2001, SIPO granted Pfizer a patent
131. See Wong, supra note 41, at 968 (noting that the six-month time frame is not
adhered to for intcrnational litigants); see, e.g., Geoffrcy A. Fowler, Starbucks Wins China
Court Case over Tradenark, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2006, http://wiwN.corpwatch.org/
article.phpid 13005 (noting that Starbucks won a trademark infringement case in 2006
that it filed in 2003).
132. See Andrews, supra note 107, at 8 (citing PricewaterhouseCoopers' estimate
that the Chinese pharmaceutical industry was worth US$28.2 billion in 2000).
133. TED C. FISHMAN, CHINA, INC.: HoW' THE RISE OF THE NEXT SUPERPOWER
CHATLENGES AMERICA AND THE WORLD 222 (2005).
134. See Andrews, supra note 107, at 8-9 ("The central government is currently
putting moncy into the pharmaccutical industry, spccifically to encouragc domestic
research and development."); Alex S. Dai, The Push for Pharmaceuticals, INSIGHT, May
2009, at 31 ("China's pharmaceutical R&D industry has grown rapidly over the past few
years as a rcsult of China's lower cost base, a liberal rcsearch and invcstncnt
environment, government support and incentives."); see also China's Pharmaceutical
Indusry Gets Major Push, CHINA.ORG, Apr. 24, 2002, available at http://Nw.china.org.
cn/cnglish/2002/Apr/31451.htm (stating that the Chinesc govcrnment plans to invest
around US$120 million in researching and developing drugs from 2002 until 2005).
135. Andrews, supra note 107, at 9 (arguing that the counterfeiters are beginning
to use IP laws as a strategic tool); see also Peter K Yu, Viagra's Upside, IP LAwA & BLS., Oct.
2004 (arguing that the Pfizer lawsuit marks the first time that Chinese companies took a
legal route to challenge a patent issued to a major international company and that
Chinesc companics arc learning how to usc the IP laws to their bcncfit).
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for Viagra's active ingredient. 3 6 Almost immediately after SIPO
granted the patent, however, a dozen Chinese pharmaceutical
companies and individuals filed petitions with SIPO to have the
patent invalidated, claiming that it failed to provide adequate
disclosure under Article 26 of the Chinese patent law and that it
lacked novelty as required by Article 22.37 On July 7, 2004, the
Patent Reexamination Board decided to invalidate the Viagra
patent, claiming that it did not meet the disclosure
requirement.13 8 Pfizer appealed the Patent Reexamination
Board's decision to the Beijing First Immediate People's Court
on September 28, 2004.1"s In June 2006, the Beijing First
Immediate People's Court reversed the invalidation and
remanded the case to SIPO for further determinations.140 The
Chinese pharmaceutical companies then appealed to the Beijing
High People's Court, which upheld the Beijing First
Intermediate Court's decision on September 7, 2007.141
136. See Andrews, supra note 107, at 11; Zheng, supra note 118.
137. See Andrews, supra note 107, at 12-13 (explaining that the basis for the
challenge of Plizer's patent was that the patent did not meet the novelty requirement
under the Chinese patent law); see also Richard A. Castellano, Patent Law for New Medical
Uses of Known Compounds and Pfizer's iagra Patent, 46 IDEA 283, 311-12 (detailing the
reasons for SIPO's invalidation of Pfizer's patent).
138. See sources cited supra note 118 (noting some of the reasons for the Patent
Reexamination Board's decision to invalidate the Viagra patent).
139. Huirui Aierlan Yaopin Gongsi Su Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guojia
Zhishichanquan Ju Zhuanli Fushen Weiyuanhui
4) [Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals v. Republic of China State Intellectual Property
Office Board of Patent Appeals First Instance Adininistrative Judgment] (Bcijing Intern.
People's Ct. June 2006), available at http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/public/
paperview.php?id=26344 [hereinafter Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals]; see Andrews,
supra note 107, at 2, n.6; Emma Barraclough, Pfizer Victorious over Viagra in China,
MANAGING INTEIL. PROP., Oct. 2007, at 10.
140. See Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals, supra note 139 (reversing the Patent
Recxamination Board's decision and remanding the case for further proceedings); see
also Barraclough, supra note 139 (stating that the Beijing First Immediate people's Court
overturned the Patent Reexamination Board decision); Tony Chen, Beiting High Court
Upholds Viagra Patent in China, IP PERSPECTIVES, Fall/Winter 2007, at 30.
141. TianIinshi Lianxiang Yaoye Youxian Gongshi Dengyu Huirui Aierlan Yaopin
Gongsi deng Zhuanli Wuxiao Xingzheng Jiufen an Er Shen Xingzheng Panjue Shu
4) [Tianjin Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Second Instance the Patent Invalid Chief
Administrative judgment], (Beijing High People's Ct. Sept. 7, 2007), available at
http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/public/papcrview.php?id=26967; see Barraclough, supra
note 139; Chen, supra note 140, at 32 (indicating that ten of the thirteen petitioners
appealed the Pfizer case to the Beijing High people's Court, which ultimately upheld the
lower court's decision).
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Another target was GlaxoSmithKline, which placed its
popular anti-diabetic drug Avandia into the Chinese market
between 2000 and 2001.142 A group of Chinese drug producers
filed petitions to invalidate GlaxoSmithKline's patent on
rosigiltazone, one of the three patented active ingredients in
Avandia.14" GlaxoSmithKline eventually decided to voluntarily
abandon its patent on rosigiltazone,144 perhaps because it
witnessed the results of the Pfizer cases and was contemptuous of
the Chinese patent law.145
Chinese pharmaceutical companies started to use IP laws as
a mechanism to invalidate international companies' patents' 4 6
causing greater frustration for international investors who must
not only prevent their patents from being infringed, but must
also protect them from being invalidated.147 International parties
142. See lai et al., supra note 66, at 450 (noting that Avandia entered the Chinese
market in the second half of 2000); jia Hepeng, Pharmaceutical Giant Gives Up Medicine
Patent, CHINA BUS. WLEKLY (Bcijing), Aug. 26, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
english /doc/ 2004-08/26/content_369176.htm (claiming that Avandia was launched in
China in 2001).
143. See supra notc 107 and accompanying tcxt (stating that sevcral Chinesc drug
companies tried to get UaxoSmithKline's patent invalidated, claiming that it did not
meet the novelty requirement).
144. See sources cited supra note 142 (claiming that GlaxoSmithKline voluntarily
abandoned its rosigiltazone patent).
145. See Hepeng, supra note 142 (citing a drug patent expert with Beijing-based
NTD Intellcctual Property Agency's statcments that GlaxoSmithKlinc's withdrawal might
have been caused by its fear of seeing the Pfizer's Viagra invalidated); see also Andrews,
supra note 107, at 18 ("[S]ome foreign companies began to express their less-than-
optimistic views of the Chincse intellcctual propcrty cnvironment through their actions.
Most notably, GlaxoSmithKline abandoned a defense of its formulation patent for
rosiglitazone, the key ingredient of its popular Type 2 diabetes drug Avandia.").
146. See, e.g., supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text (describing how
UaxoSmithKline abandoned its Avandia patent after several Chinese pharmaceutical
companies attempted to get it invalidated).
147. Bai et al., supra note 66, at 449 (explaining that multinational companics are
both suing for patent infringement and being sued to get their patents invalidated);
Ram Deshpande & Alok Aggarwal, Patently Speaking: Failure to Heed IP in China Can Be
Costly, MAG. 01 INTELL. PROP. & TLCH., July 15, 2009, available at
http://www.ipfrontline.com/printtemplate.asp?id=23218 ("Litigation statistics indicate
that Chinese companies are increasingly becoming more aggressive with patent
enforcement and non-Chincse companics opcrating in China have started to fccl the
heat."); see also Hepeng, supra note 142 (citing Gu1o Xiaodong as suggesting that
domestic pharmaceutical firms may be tempted to copy international companies'
pharmaceutical compounds by looking for loopholes in their Chincse patents).
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have increasingly become involved in patent litigation as both
defendants and plaintiffs.148
China's IP protection scheme has changed significantly
since the days of strict adherence to Confucian principles. Over
the years, due to her own desire become a major participant in
the global economy and pressure by other countries, China has
tried to improve her IP laws by amending them. The 2000
Chinese patent law, however, was deficient in many ways and did
not offer enough protection for patents. The United States
became wary of China's ineffective patent law, and filed a WTO
complaint against China in 2005, claiming that China did not
meet her WTO obligations. China, in turn, tried to strengthen
her IP laws, but the United States saw China's attempts as
inadequate. International companies also became disdainful of
the Chinese patent law when Chinese companies started using
the law to invalidate international companies' patents. In
addition, international, especially American, litigants face a
number of challenges when litigating a patent infringement suit
in China. As a result of all the complaints, China became
increasingly cognizant of the need to amend her patent law.
II. THIRD AMENDMENT TO THE CHINESE PATENT LAW
PROMISING GLOW OR DISAPPOINTING FLICKER?
Complaints about the Chinese patent law did not go
unheard. In 2008, China amended her patent law for the third
time, hoping that the third amendment would address all the
previous concerns. Whether the third amendment will resolve
the earlier deficiencies is still uncertain and remains a point of
disagreement among scholars.
Section A of this Part delineates the changes that the first
and second amendments made to the Chinese patent law and
outlines the problems and deficiencies in the Chinese patent law
prior to the third amendment. Section B discusses the third
amendment's major effects on the Chinese patent law and
compares the state of Chinese patent law before and after the
148. See Bai et al, supra note 66, at 449 ("While foreign parties have brought fewer
than 5% of these cases so far, they have increasingly become involved in the litigation,
both as defendants and plaintiffs."); Deshpande & Aggarwal, supra note 147 ("In 1,139
of [the 23,518 1 litigations filed in China in 2008], a foreign company was either the
plaintiff or the defendant, which is more than triple the number in 2006).
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third amendment. Section C sets forth the different scholarly
arguments about the anticipated effects of the third amendment
on patent protection and litigation in China. It will first articulate
the positive anticipated effects, with an emphasis on the
particular sections of the third amendment that are predicted to
create these improvements. Last, this Part discusses scholarly
arguments that anticipate the third amendment's negative effects
and predicts its inability to reform patent protection and patent
litigation in China, as well as the particular sections that will be
most impactful.
A. The First and Second Amendments to the Chinese Patent Law
Since its enactment in 1984, the Chinese patent law has
undergone three amendments.149 First, in 1992, it was amended
to expand patentable subject matter to include pharmaceuticals
and extend the patent terms for invention patents from fifteen to
twenty years.750 The second amendment in 2000 was made in
anticipation of China's accession to the WTO151 and included a
number of provisions that bolstered the protection and
enforcement of patents in China.'5 2 Various parts of the second
amendment focused on assisting non-Chinese entities in filing
patents in China.15 3 Unfortunately, despite the changes brought
by the second amendment, the Chinese patent law was still
149. See infra note 150 and accompanying text and Part II.A-B (detailing the
changcs that the thrcc aicndincts made to the Chincse patent law).
150. Xia-Yun Gao, An Introduction to Administrative Protection for Pharmaceuticals,
Comment, 9 DUKF J. COMP. & INT'l L. 259, 259 (1998) (stating that in 1992,
administrative protection for pharmaccutical products was providcd); Wei-Ning Yang &
Andrew Y. Yen, The Dragon Gets New IP Claws: The Latest Amendments to the Chinese Patent
Law, INTELL. IPROP. & TECH. L.J., May 2009, at 18, 18 (mentioning that the 1992
aicndincnt allowcd pharmaceuticals to fall under patentablc subjcct matter).
151. Yang & Yen, supra note 150, at 19; see also Jiwen Chen, Better Patent Law for
International Commitment -The Amendment of Chinese Patent Law, I RICH.J. GLOBAL 1L. &
Bus. 61, 61 (2001).
152. See Chen, supra note 151, at 61 (asserting that the second amendment brought
upon three major changes: new judicial and administrative protection, improved
application proccdurcs, and simplified enforccment procedures); see also Yang & Ycn,
supra note 150, at 19 ("The 2000 amendment incorporates various provisions to
strengthen protection and enforcement of patent rights in China.").
153. See Chcn, supra notc 151, at 67-69 (dctailing the provisions that simplify the
patent application process for international entities); see also Yang & Yen, supra note 150,
at 19 ("Various provisions of the 2000 amendment also aim to facilitate the patent
application process for forcign entities in China.").
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deficient in many aspects.15 4 The 2000 Chinese patent law was still
unclear in many areas and open to interpretation.'5 5 The
ambiguity of the 2000 Chinese patent law allowed bad faith
applicants to file for patents for prior arts or inventions and
bring frivolous infringement suits without any repercussions.15
These deficiencies led to inadequate patent protection and
accentuated the need for the Chinese patent law to be amended
for a third time.
B. The Changes Brought by the Third Amendment
On June 5, 2008, China's State Council issued the National
Intellectual Property Strategy Outline ("Outline"), which laid out
a plan to help China establish higher efficiency in the creation,
utilization, protection, and administration of IP rights by 2020.157
The Outline emphasized that China needs to establish a
comprehensive IP system, promote creation and utilization of IP,
increase IP protection, and prevent the abuse of IP rights.15 8 The
third amendment, finalized in December 2008, increased
monetary damages against patent infringers and provided
additional administrative and judicial tools to better protect
patents.159 It prohibits two types of patent law violations: acts of
"passing off" patents and patent infringement."o
154. See supra Part I.C-D (describing the ineffectiveness of Chinese patent law prior
to the third amendment in deterring patent infringement).
155. See supra Part I (discussing the problems and loopholes of the 2000 Chinese
patent law).
156. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (arguing that because the 2000
patent law does not require utility and design patents to go through substantial
examination, it was possible for some bad actors to apply for a patent for a prior art or
design and immediately accuse others of infringing his patent).
157. See Guo jia Zhi Hui Chan Quan Zhan Lue Gang Yao (R )
[National Intellectual Property Strategy Outline] (promulgated by St. Council China),
Issue No. 17, Serial No. 1268, ST. COUNCIL GAZ. (June 20, 2008), available at
http://www, .gov.cn/gongbao/contcnt/2008/contcnt_1018942.htim.
158. See id. (listing the four goals and detailing how to achieve them).
159. See Yang & Yen, supra note 150, at 21 (asserting that the third amendment
aspired to enhance the protection of patent rights in China by increasing monetary
damages and providing administrative and judicial tools to improve enforcement of
patent rights). See generally The Third Amendment to Patent Law to Increase the Strength of
Patent Protection on Six Measures, GUTZHOU PROVINCE INTELL. PROP. BUREAU (2009),
available at http://www.gzsipo.gov.cn/ywdt/display.asp?id=784 [hereinafter Patent
Protection on Six Measures].
160. See Patent Protection on Six Measures, supra note 159 (asserting that the third
amendment will provide clearer terms of what constitutes patent infringement); Yang &
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The "passing off' of patents occurs when a person deceives
others into believing someone else's patent is his own or that he
holds the patent to an unpatented product or process."'
Specifically, passing off patents includes manufacturing or selling
generic products with a patent marking; continuing to
manufacture or sell a product or process whose patent has been
invalidated; advertising or promoting an unpatented technology
as a patented technology; and forging or transforming any patent
certificate, patent document or patent application.1"2 The third
amendment drastically increased the civil fines for passing off
patents. The third amendment provides that, in addition to
taking the income earned from acts of passing off patents, the
Patent Administrative Department' 6 has the right to impose a
fine up to four times the illegal income of the violator in contrast
to the previous maximum of three times the illegal earnings.164
The third amendment provides that, absent any illegal earnings,
the Patent Administrative Department may fine the violator up to
CNY200,000 (about US$29,200), compared to the previous cap
of CNY50,000 (about US$7300).6 5
Ycn, supra note 150, at 21 (stating that the third amendment to the Chincse patent law
would specify the acts of patent counterfeiting offenses).
161. See Patent Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong.,
Mar. 12, 1984, 3d amend., Dcc. 27, 2008) (Lawinfochina), art. 69 (China) [hicrinafter
2008 Patent Law] (stating that a person is not infringing when, after the sale of a
patented product was imported by the patentee or with authorization of the patentee, or
was dircctly obtaincd by the using the patentcd process, he uses, offers to sell, or sells
that product); Yang & Yen, supra note 150, at 21 (clarifying what constitutes passing off
patents).
162. See The People's Govcrinment of Henan Province, Administrative Guidancc
Issued Regarding the Punishment for Passing Off Patents and Passing Off Products or
Processes (2007), available at http://www.henan.gov.cn/bsfw/system/2007/09/06/
010040254.shtil.
163. See 2008 Patent Law, supra note 161, art. 3 ("The patent administrative
department of the State Council shall be responsible for the administration of the
patent work throughout China, uniformly acccpt and examinc applications for patcnts,
and grant patents in accordance with the law.").
164. Compare 2008 Patent Law, supra note 161, art. 63 (providing that infringers
can be fincd up to four tiics their illegal incomc), with 2000 Patent Law, supra notc 64,
art. 58 (providing that infringers can only be lined up to three times their illegal
income).
165. Compare 2008 Patcnt Law, supra notc 161, art. 63 (" [I]f there arc no illcgal
earnings, the fine will not be more than RMB 200,000 yuan."), with 2000 Patent Law,
supra note 57, art. 58 (" [W]here there is no illegal income, he may be imposed a fine of
no more than 50,000 RMB.").
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The third amendment also gives the Patent Administrative
Department more resources to investigate acts of passing off
patents. Under the newly amended Chinese patent law, when
infringement is suspected, the Patent Administrative Department
may question the parties involved; investigate the facts; conduct
an on-site inspection of the location where the act took place;
review and copy contracts, invoices, accounting books, and other
relevant documents; inspect the products; and seize or confiscate
the products if there is proof that they are passed off products.lt6
The third amendment also provides guidelines for
determining the amount of compensation for the damages
caused by infringers.167 It mandates that the compensation be
assessed based on the actual losses suffered by the patentee.'68 If
the actual losses cannot be calculated, then the compensation
must be assessed based on the profit made by the infringer
through infringement. lt When both of these figures cannot be
determined, the damage can be assessed by referring to the
appropriate multiple of the royalties for the patent.17 0 If all three
methods fail, the court can determine a compensation amount
between CNY1O,000 (about US$1500) to CNY1,000,000 (about
US$150,000) based on the type of patent infringed and the facts
166. 2008 Patent Law, supra note 161, art. 64. ("The relevant patent administrative
authority may, based on the evidence it obtains, query the related parties and conduct
investigations concerning infringing activities when investigating the suspected passing-
off matters; and may examine the place where the suspected infringement took place;
view, reproduce any contracts, invoices, books and other materials related to the
suspected infringement; examine the products related to suspected infringement, and
may scal up or seize the products which have been proved to pass off patent rights.").
167. See id. art. 65.
168. See id. ("The amount of compensation for the damage caused by patent
infringement shall be assessed on the basis of the loss actually suffered by the
patentee.").
169. See id.
170. See id. ("If it is difficult to determine the losses which the patentec has
suffered or the profits which the infringer has earned, the amount may be assessed by
reference to the appropriate multiple of the amount of royalty fee for patent
exploitation.").
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surrounding the infringement.'7 ' The previous cap for judicially
issued fines was CNY500,000 (about US$75,000).172
Before the third amendment was enacted, the Chinese
patent law did not clearly define what constituted designs and
inventions.17" Thus three paragraphs were added to Article 2 of
the Chinese patent law to clarify the meanings of design,
invention, and utility model. "Design" is defined as any "new
design of a product's shape, pattern or a combination thereof, as
well as the combination of the color and the shape or pattern of
a product, which creates an aesthetic feeling and is fit for
industrial application."17 4 "Invention" means "any new technical
solution relating to a product, a process or improvement
thereof."' 75 "Utility model" covers "any new technical solution
relating to a product's shape, structure or a combination thereof,
which is fit for practical use."17 6
The third amendment also heightened the standard for
novelty. The Chinese patent law requires invention patents and
utility model patents to possess novelty, creativity, and practical
applicability.'7 7 Article 22 of the Chinese patent law was amended
to adopt the "absolute novelty" standard that is internationally
171. See id. ("If it is diflicult to determine the losses which the patentee has
suffered, the profits which the infringer has earned, or the loyalty [sic] fee for patent
exploitation, the people's court may award damages no less than 10,000 yuan and no
more than 1,000,000 yuan depending on the type of patent right, the nature and gravity
of the infringing act etc.").
172. Several provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Issues Concerning
Applicable Laws to the Trial of Patent Controversies (promulgated by the Sup. People's
Ct. on June 19, 2001, effective July 1, 2001), available at http://wmy.sipo.gov.cn/
sipo2008/zcg/ lg/zl /s 7 s/ 200804/ t20080415_377922.html.
173. See 2000 Patent Law, supra note 57, art. 2 ("In this law, 'invention-creations'
mean inventions, utility models and designs.")Fcng, supra note 123, at 24 (declaring that
utility models and designs had not been clarilied before the third amendment to the
Chinese patent law).
174. See id. art. 2. American case law has defined "design" in a similar way. See In re
Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 268 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (holding that a design patent protects the
"design for an article, and is inclusive of ornamental designs of all kinds including
surface ornamentation as well as configuration of goods." (emphasis in original)).
175. 2008 patent Law, supra note 161, art. 2.
176. See id.
177. See id. art. 22 ("Any invention or utility model for which a patent is to be
granted shall be novel, inventive and practically applicable."); see alsojohn V. Grobowski
& Yiqiang Li, Amendments to the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, FAEGRE &
BENSON LLP, (Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.facgrc.com/showarticlc.aspx?Show=9830.
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used. 78 The "absolute novelty" standard dictates that the
invention not be known publicly either inside or outside China
prior to the date of a patent application.179 Prior to the third
amendment, Chinese inventors were allowed to file for
technology or invention patents that were known or used in
other countries but not publicly known or used in China.81 1
Under the 2008 Chinese patent law, Chinese patent applicants
could not file for invention patents that were attributable to any
existing technology published either inside or outside of China
or technology that was used openly or known to the public in
China.181 The third amendment also provides for a new kind of
judicial order that could be used to preserve evidence in patent
infringement cases by prohibitng an alleged infringer from
destroying incriminating evidence when facing a suit. Patentees
or plaintiffs can request the court to assist them in preserving
evidence if the evidence is hard to obtain or has been
destroyed.18 2
The amended law also incorporated provisions designed to
facilitate the process of getting a preliminary injunction. Article
66 provides that if the patentee can present evidence that (1)
another person is infringing, or will soon infringe, his patent; (2)
the infringer does not have any intention of stopping; and (3)
such infringement would likely cause the patentee "irreparable
178. See 2008 patent Law, supra note 161, art. 22 ("'Novelty' means that the
invention or utility model shall neither belong to the prior art, nor has any entity or
individual previously filed before the date of filing with the patent administration
department under the State Council an application on an identical invention or utility
model which was recorded in patent application documents or other gazetted patent
documents published after the said date of filing.").
179. Id. ("The 'prior art' referred to in this Law refers to any technology known to
the public before the filing date of the patent application in China or abroad.").
180. See Feng, supra note 123, at 53 (articulating that before the third amendment,
the Chinese patent law allowed applicants to obtain patents for a technology or design
"that is not used publicly or is not know by the public in other ways in China, but is
actually used publicly or has corresponding designs abroad"); see also Yang & Yen, supra
note 150, at 22 (claiming that the 2000 Chinese patent law "allows publicly known
inventions that have not been specifically disclosed in publications in a foreign country
to be patentable in China if it is not publicly known or used in China").
181. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (describing what novelty is under
the current Chinese patent law).
182. 2008 Patent Law, supra note 161, art. 67 ("In order to prevent infringing
activity, under the circumstance that the evidence might be destroyed or later difficult to
obtain, the patentee or a related inlured party may before filing a law suit apply to the
people's court for evidence preservation.").
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harm," the patentee can ask the court for a preliminary
injunction. 83 The court then has forty-eight hours to make a
decision.184 If a concerned party is not satisfied with the ruling,
he may apply for reconsideration, but only once.18
The third amendment also allows for more non-
infringement defenses by codifying the prior-art defense, which
allows the accused to claim as a defense that the patented design
or technology has been revealed in prior art or design.181) This
allows for quicker adjudication of cases by allowing defendants to
prove their innocence without going through the formal
adjudication process, which is split into two processes: the Patent
Reexamination Board first must rule on the validity of the patent,
and then a court will decided whether the patent is being
infringed once it is found to be valid.187 The case will stay in court
until the Patent Reexamination Board determines the validity of
the patent, causing lengthy adjudications of cases.188
The third amendment lays out clearer terms prohibiting
double patenting, which occurs when two or more inventions-
creations are granted separate patents even though the main
characteristic components protected by the patents are the
same.189 Double patenting occurs frequently in China because
183. See 2008 patent Law, supra note 161, art. 66 ("Where any patentee or
interested party has evidence to prove that another person is infringing or will soon
infringe its or his patent right . . . it or he may, before filing a suit, apply to the people's
court for an order to stop the relevant acts.").
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id. art. 62 ("During a patent infringement dispute, if the alleged infringer
has evidence proving its or his technology or design belongs to the prior art or is a prior
design, it will not constitute patent infringement.").
187. See Yang & Yen, supra note 150, at 23 (explaining that the prior-art defense
quickens the adjudication of infringement cases because a defendant's innocence can
be determined without going through the usual adludication process).
188. See id. (claiming that patent litigation cases might not be resolved for years
due to the adjudication process in China); see also USTR, supra note 93 (reporting that a
patent infringement case takes four to seven years to complete in Chinese civil court).
189. See Bai et al., What Does the Third Amendment to China's Patent Law Mean to You?,
JONES DAY (Jan. 2009), http://www.joncsday.comncwsknoowledgc/publicationdetail.
aspx?publication=5806 (stating that double patenting occurs when applicants file for two
patents for the same invention-creation); see also Feng, supra note 123, at 25-26 ("The
so-called double patenting can be understood as the situation in which two or more ...
inventions-creations are applied for patent separately and are granted patents as their
main technical characteristic components to be applied for protection are the same or
identical technical solution.").
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applicants often file for both a utility model and invention patent
for their invention-creation. 90 The third amendment added a
provision to Article 9 that addressed this issue:
For any identical invention-creation, only one patent
right shall be granted. However, with respect to the
application of a utility model patent and invention patent for
the identical invention-creation filed by the same applicant
on the same day, the invention patent may be granted if this
utility model patent right obtained first is still in force, and
the applicant declares to abandon the obtained utility model
patent has been granted."1
The third amendment thus allows an individual to apply for a
utility or invention patent for the same invention-creation on the
same day, but prohibits him from holding both a utility and
invention patent for an invention-creation.192
Prior to passing the third amendment, international
enterprises that did not have a habitual residence or business
office in China had to appoint a patent agency designated by the
Patent Administration Department to act as their agent when
applying for a patent or handling other patent-related matters."
With the changes brought by the third amendment, these
international enterprises now need only appoint any "patent
agency legally established to act on [their] behalf," 94 and not
necessarily one designated by the Patent Administration
Department. This change makes it more convenient for
international enterprises without habitual residences or business
offices in China to choose patent agents to handle their patent-
related matters.
190. See Bai et al, supra note 189 ("It has been a widespread practice [in China] of
patent applicants to obtain invention patcnts and utility model patents on the saic
inventions."); see also Yang & Yen, supra note 150, at 20 ("Double patenting presents a
special problem under Chinese patent law because China offers both invention and
utility modcl patents.").
191. 2008 patent Law, supra note 161, art. 9.
192. Id.; see Feng, supra note 123, at 27 (explaining that the 2008 patent law
permitted the saic applicant to apply for a utility modcl patcnt or an invcntion patent
on the same day based on the same invention-creation without committing double
patenting).
193. 2000 Patcnt Law, supra not 57, art. 10 ("Any assignincnt, by a Chinesc entity
or individual, of the right to apply for a patent, or of the patent right, to a foreigner
must be approved by the competent department concerned of the State Council.").
194. 2008 Patcnt Law, supra notc 161, art. 19.
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The amended Chinese patent law also provides that the
Patent Administrative Department may grant a compulsory
license to manufacture a medicine that has been patented in
China and to ship the patented medication to other countries or
regions, provided that the manufacturing process conforms to
the provisions of the relevant international treaties to which
China is a party. 95 In 2005, SIPO had already issued an order
granting compulsory licenses for health purposes, but the
amended Chinese patent law highlights and legitimizes this.' 96
The third amendment also incorporates the "Bolar exemption,"
which exempts someone from infringement if he is producing,
utilizing, or importing patented medicine to provide the
information as needed for administrative approval and for
scientific research and experimentation.' 97
The third amendment also addresses co-owner rights.
Article 15 provides that if there is an agreement between co-
owners regarding the exploitation of a jointly owned patent, the
agreement must be followed. 9 8 If there is no such agreement,
the co-owner may exploit the patent without another owner's
consent by licensing it non-exclusively, but all royalties from that
licensing must be distributed between the co-owners.'n In
195. See id. art. 50 ("For the purpose of public health, the patent administrative
department of the State Council may grant a compulsory license to manufacture a drug
which has been granted a patent right in China and to export it to the countrics or
regions specified in related international conventions in which China is a contracting
member.").
196. See Approach to Implementing Compulsory Licensc Involving Issues Relating
to public Health (promulgated by the State Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C. on
Nov. 29, 2005, eflective Jan. 1, 2006), available at http://big5.sipo.gov.cn/ www/
sipo2008/zwgs/ling/200804/t20080402_366969.html (cxplaining that as long it is in
compliance with the TRIPS agreement, SIPO has the authority to grant compulsory
licenses so that patented drugs can be delivered to regions and countries that need
them); see also Yang & Yen, supra note 150, at 24 (stating that Article 50 was mostly an
attempt to clarify the patent law since SIPO had already authorized the granting of
compulsory licenses for health purposes in 2005).
197. See 2008 Patent Law, supra note 161, art. 69, § 5 (providing that infringement
does not include the "providing of information needed for the administrative approval,
manufacture, use, import of a drug or a medical apparatus, and exclusively for such
manufacture any import of a patented drug or a patented medical apparatus").
198. See id. art. 15 ("If the co-owners of a patent application right or patent right
have an agreement on the exercise of those rights, the agreement shall apply.").
199. See id. ("If therc is no such agreement, any co-owners may independently
exploit or license others to exploit the patent through ordinary licenses. Any royalties
obtained through licensing others to exploit the patent shall be distributed amongst all
the co-owners.").
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addition, exploiting the patent in other ways, such as granting an
exclusive license, requires the consent of all the co-owners.20 1o
Article 8 reaffirms Article 15's rules on co-owner rights. 2ox
The third amendment made significant changes to the
Chinese patent law in the areas of patent protection and
patentable subject matter definition. It also provided clear terms
about compulsory licensing and co-owner rights and added the
Bolar exemption as well as provisions about double patenting.
The actual effects of these changes, however, are yet to be
determined.
C. Will the Third Amendment Bring Great Benefits to International
Litigants or Maintain the Status Quo?
Some argue that the third amendment has revolutionized
the way multinational companies will compete in the Chinese
market.202 At least one optimistic commentator, Benjamin Bai,
thinks that the amended Chinese patent law has a great deal to
offer, and if international companies become better acquainted
with China's IP protection system, they can use the existing
protections to their own advantage. 20s Bai acknowledges that
international companies are reluctant to file patent infringement
cases in China because of the misconception that the Chinese
200. See id. ("Except for the situation provided in the above paragraph, the
cxcrcise of a jointly-owncd patcnt application right or patcnt right shall be conscnted by
all co-owners.").
201. See id. art. 8. ("For an invention-creation made by two or more entities or
individuals, or madc by an cntity or individual in cxccution of a commission givcn to it
or him by another entity or individual, the right to apply for a patent belongs, unless
otherwise agreed upon, to the entity or individual that made, or to the entities or
individuals that jointly madc, the invention-crcation. After the application is approved,
the entity or individual that applies for it shall be the patentee.").
202. Hai et al., supra note 189 ("The Third Amendment to the patent Law contains
sea [sic] changcs that will significantly affect how Chincsc and multinational companies
will compete on the basis of patents in this emerging market."); Phong Nguyen,
Changing Landscape: Introduction to the Third Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law, ABA
(2009), http://www.abanct.org/buslaw/commfiittces/CL983500pub/neiwslettcr/
200906/nguyen.pdf ("The third amendment will change the way foreign companies
obtain patent protection and conduct business in China.").
203. Bcnjainin Bai, Yes, China Does Protect Intellectual Property, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/S111000142405274870425930457504415
0656353806.html ("The key is for foreign businesses to understand how IP protection
works in China and to takc bettcr advantage of the protcctions that cxist.").
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court system favors domestic plaintiffs. 204 He attempts to debunk
this belief, however, by pointing to Neoplan v. Beijing Zhongtong
Xinghua Automobile Selling Co., a Chinese case in which a German
bus company won a US$3,000,000 judgment against two Chinese
companies for patent infringement.115 He also points to the State
Council's Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy
as a clear indication of China's policy makers' desire to build a
functional IP regime.2 116
Proponents argue that the absolute novelty requirement
stipulated by the third amendment should also appease
international companies' fear and skepticism of the court system
and should also encourage more international investment in
China.2 07 Under the absolute novelty requirement, Chinese
companies cannot file for a drug patent if the drug has been
patented elsewhere in the world.2 118 The third amendment also
brings Chinese patent law closer in line with international
standards, which should encourage multinational companies to
look at the patent protection system in China with a new and
more optimistic eye.20 9
Even though the third amendment is seen as a symbol of the
Chinese central government's commitment to develop and
204. Id. (arguing that international companics' fear that they arc prejudiccd by the
Chinese court system is unfounded).
205. liai, supra note 203 (citing the Neoplan case as evidence that international
companies are not prejudiced in China); see Ncoplan v. Beijing Zhongtong Xinghua
Auto. Selling Co., (Beijing Interm. People's Ct..Jan. 14, 2009).
206. liai, supra note 203 (" [The] 'Outline of the National Intellectual property
Strategy' . . . acknowledges that robust IP protection is a critical component of an
innovation-driven economy.").
207. See Nguyen, supra note 202 (arguing that the absolute novelty requirement
eliminates a loophole often exploited by Chincse companics); see also HcpcngJia, China
Tightens IP Protection, but Concerns Linger, 27 NATURE BIOTECH. 787, 787 (2009) (listing
the absolute novelty requirement as one of the several improvements in the Chinese
patent law).
208. See 2008 Patent Law, supra note 161, art. 2 (explaining that a patent will only
be granted if the invention/technology is not publicly known or used in China and
abroad); see also Jia, supra note 207 ("With the new 'absolutc' principle, a Chincse patent
can only be issued if the invention is totally new worldwide.").
209. See liai, supra note 203 (asserting that the amended patent law is more in line
with the international standards, which should encourage international companics to
assume that China forecefully protects patents); Grobowski & Li, supra note 177
(indicating that the third amendment was designed partly to align Chinese patent law
with international standards).
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implement more effective patent laws,210 some scholars note that
the Chinese central government's dedication to implementing
efficient patent protection laws is not mirrored on the local
level.211 These scholars believe that without the participation of
the local governments and stricter enforcement of the law,
pharmaceutical counterfeiting will continue to be a problem.2'2
The central government consists primarily of legislative and
policy-making bodies, and cooperation is therefore needed at the
local level to implement and enforce laws.213 In recent years,
there has been an increase in the independence and autonomy
of Chinese local governments, which has enhanced the stability
of the counterfeit drug market.214 Local officials are known to
accept bribes to ignore the counterfeiting problems and may
even participate in the counterfeiting business themselves. 215
Counterfeiters also provide indirect financial benefits to
210. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (discussing that the third
amendment brought the Chinese patent law more in line with international standards).
211. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text (cxplaining that local
governments often protect the counterfeiters because the counterfeiters are vital to their
respective economies).
212. See Bronshtcin, supra note 2, at 440 (arguing that the Chincse central
government's fight against counterfeiting could work if the local government corruption
that undermines existing counterfeit drug regulations is eliminated); c.f Nelson et al.,
supra note 9, at 1089 (noting that enforcement efforts arc hampered by local corruption
and protectionism).
213. See Bronshtein, supra note 2, at 459 (" [T]his central level authority is
comprised mainly of legislative and policy-making bodies, while actual implementation
and enforcement of law occurs at the local level."); Chow, supra note 88 (arguing that
although the central government understands the importance of protecting IIP, it is lust
comprised of legislative and policy-making bodies; actual implementation and
enforcement of JPR laws has fallen on local governments, which are slow to embrace this
commitment).
214. See Bronshtcin, supra note 2, at 459 (arguing that "there has been an
increased trend toward solidifying local autonomy in China" and these increasingly
powerful local governments support the counterfeiting business); Evans, supra note 63,
at 590 (arguing that China was faced with the rise of corruption and regionalism due to
decentralization); Nelson et al., supra note 9, at 1089 ("Enforcement efforts, particularly
at the local level, are hampered by poor coordination among Chinese Government
ministries and agencies [and] local protectionism and corruption.").
215. See Evans, supra note 63, at 591 ("Moreover, many local officials directly
profited from piracy through kickbacks and bribes, while other high-ranking officers
were involved firsthand in the production of illegal goods and services."); see also Wong,
supra note 41, at 965 (" [L]ocal olicials often profit from counterfeit goods through
kickbacks or bribes or may even be involved with the production of illegal goods and
services.").
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communities by patronizing their restaurants and hotels.211 In
certain localities, the drug counterfeiting business has become so
integrated in the local market that it is hard to differentiate
legitimate businesses from illegal ones.217 In other instances,
officials are aware of counterfeit pharmaceuticals and related
activities, but chose not to report them for fear that it would taint
China's reputation.' 8 When officials do not report such activity,
however, they often become scapegoats and receive severe
punishments when the counterfeit pharmaceuticals scandals are
made public. 219 Scholars question if the goal of keeping Chinese
citizens safe from counterfeit drugs is seen as less valuable than
the potential earning power of those drugs.2201
216. Bronshtein, supra note 2, at 460 (" [L] ocal governments and communities also
benefit indirectly from the counterfeit drug market. In many localities, counterfeiters
significantly contribute to the local market through the use of transportation,
restaurants, and hotels."); Chow, supra note 88 (mentioning that in some localities,
"legitimate businesses such as hotels, restaurants, nightclubs, storage and transportation
companies have been created to support the trade in counterfeit goods").
217. Chow, supra note 88 (explaining that tax payments and the creation of lawful
businesses have incorporated counterfeiting into the legitimate local Job market, and
that the removal of counterfeiting in certain localities would devastate the local
economy); see also Bronshtein, supra note 2, at 460 ("In some regions, the counterfeit
market is so intertwined with the legitimate local market that is has become nearly
impossible to distinguish the counterfeit from the legitimate business.").
218. See William 0. Hennessey, Protection of Intellectual Property in China (30 Years
and More): A Personal Reflection, 46 Hous. L. REv. 1257, 1289 (2008) (declaring that some
officials knew that milk products were laced with melamine, but failed to report it
because they feared getting in trouble for tainting China's name during the 2008
Olympics). See generally Jim Yardely & David Barboza, Despite Warnings, China's Regulators
Failed to Stop Tainted Milk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at Al (discussing how the Chinese
government tried to silence the concerns about the tainted milk during the Olympics to
put up a good front, despite receiving many warnings and concerns).
219. See, e.g., Hennessey, supra note 218, at 1289 (reporting that, when the scandal
was publicized, the same officials who failed to report the melaminc laced milk out of
fear that they would be punished for making China look bad during the 2008 Olympics
were punished for not reporting it earlier ); More Officials Punished over Sanlu Scandal,
CHINA.ORG.CN (Mar. 20, 2009), http://wwwN.china.org.cn/govcrnment/central
government /2009-03/20/content 17477922.htm (announcing that the responsible
health officials were either demoted or fired for their failure to report the melamine-
laced milk).
220. See, e.g., Hennessey, supra note 218, at 1290 (questioning "if the right of the
public to be free from dangerous products (including counterfeit medicines) is
'balanced' against a local 'quick buck'"); see also Grcgory H. Fuller, Comment, Economic
Warlords: How De Facto Federalism Inhibits China's Compliance with International Trade Law
and jeopardizes Global Environmental Initiatives, 75 TENN. 1,. REv. 545, 556-69 (2008)
(discussing the conflict between drug regulation and IP protection in China).
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Scholars are equally skeptical of the Chinese court system,
which is reliant on the local government in many areas.2 2 ' Judges
risk the loss of benefits or even removal if they rule in a way that
the local government dislikes.222 Judges are also often improperly
trained and have little knowledge about patent infringement,
which prolongs the adjudication of these cases.2 23 The USTR
recognized that there has been an increase in judicial
enforcement related to infringing activities in Beijing and
Shanghai, but this increase is limited to those areas.2 24
Other scholars criticize the compulsory licensing provisions
in the newly amended Chinese patent law, arguing that it
destroys the purposes of patents and discourages international
companies from obtaining pharmaceutical patents in China.22 5
Scholars argue that the language of these provisions is unclear
and affords courts too much discretion in determining whether a
compulsory license should be granted.22' Some even predict that
officials will use the vague wording of the provisions and the
221. See, e.g., Bronshtcin, supra note 2, at 461 ("In fact, many leaders of Chinese
local governments view courts simply as 'subordinate departments of the local
government.'"); Wong, supra note 41, at 970 ("Fear of removal can result in judges
unreasonably denying motions for transfer of forum, delivering verdicts favorable to
local parties or refusing to respect the former judgments by other courts.").
222. See sources cited supra note 221 (discussing the challenges that judges face
when they do not rule to the liking of the local government).
223. See USTR, supra note 93 (explaining that because most judges lack necessary
technical training, the adjudication process is inefficient, unpredictable, and
unnecessarily long); see also Bronshtein, supra note 2, at 461 (emphasizing that there is a
shortage of adequately traincd judgcs).
224. See USTR, 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 20 (2010), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfmsend/1906 ("There have been some improvements,
including judicial enforcement related to infringing activities in retail markets in Beijing
and Shanghai. Other welcoming steps include judicial authorities sentencing
wholesalers to prison terms, and holding retail market landlords liable for failing to take
appropriate measures to prevent infringement. Unfortunately, outside Beijing and
Shanghai, there have been limited efforts to hold landlords liable for infringement that
occurs on their premises.").
225. Ronald A. Cass, Patent Reform with Chinese Characteristics, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,
2009, http://onnlie.wsj.com/article/S123419814824764201.html ("Compulsory
licensing threatens the fundamental property right that patents confer."); see aisoYang &
Yen, supra note 150, at 123 (stating that the compulsory licensing provisions might
discourage pharmaceutical companies from obtaining additional patents in China).
226. See Cass, supra note 225 (arguing that the compulsory licensing provisions
contain many vague terms that allow a wide range of discretion); see, e.g., 2008 Patent
Law, supra note 161, art. 55 ("In the decision granting the compulsory license for
exploitation, the scope and duration of the exploitation shall be specified on the basis of
the reasons justifying the grant.").
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"discretionary powers" given to them to protect Chinese firms
and to hinder the most powerful international competitors.227
Some scholars, however, argue that China could use the
amended Chinese patent law to generate goodwill among
developing and undeveloped countries that do not have the
ability to manufacture the drugs themselves by utilizing
compulsory licenses to provide exportation of pharmaceuticals to
these countries.228 Scholars are also wary of the addition of the
Bolar exception because it allows for the manufacturing of
patented drugs without obtaining licenses and warn
pharmaceutical patent holders against this newly adopted
exception to patent infringement.2 2 9
Even though the third amendment significantly increases
the fines for patent infringement and provides for more judicial
and administrative tools to fight patent infringement, patent
infringement will continue to occur if the Chinese patent law is
not enforced. The third amendment introduces some provisions
that can be easily manipulated into a defense against patent
infringement, such as the Bolar exemption and compulsory
licensing. Local governmental protectionism and corruption
pose as major barriers to the proper enforcement of the Chinese
patent law.
Before the third amendment was enacted, the Chinese
patent law did not sufficiently deter patent infringement. The
third amendment drastically improves the patent protection in
China. Advocates of the third amendment believe that it
cultivates more trust in the Chinese patent protection system.
Skeptics argue that lack of enforcement of the patent law at the
227. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 225 ("If history provides guidance, officials will be
tempted to use discretionary powers to protect Chinese firms and to handicap the
strongest forcign competitors."); USTR, supra note 5, at 14-15 (stating that therc still
exists longstanding concerns that domestic companies are favored over multinational
companies in China, especially given that the Chinese government is considering policy
changcs in the arca of compulsory licensing of patented invcntions, which can be uscd
against international companies).
228. See, e.g., Yang & Yen, supra note 150, at 24 ("China could use Article 50 to
gcncrate significant goodwill among dcveloping and undevclopcd countries.").
229. See George Chan, Amendments to China's Patent Law, IIP AUSTRALTA (2009),
http://www.ipau'stralia.gov.au/pdfs/general/patent law updatesChina.pdf (warning
patentces in the pharmaceutical and biotechnological industry that the Bolar exemption
is an exemption from patent infringement); jia, supra note 207, at 788 (stating that the
new rules allows generic producers to study the original patented products claiming that
it is rescarch without being chargcd with infringcmcnt).
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local level will perpetuate counterfeiting regardless of the
changes made by the third amendment.
III. THE CHINESE PA TENT LAW WILL CONTINUE TO BE
INEFFECTIVE AS LONG AS LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CORRUPTION AND PROTECTIONISM EXISTS
Scholars have predicted both positive and negative effects of
the third amendment to the Chinese patent law. While the third
amendment was enacted with the purpose of improving patent
protection in China and making the Chinese patent law more
comprehensive, it will have very little effect if the Chinese patent
law is not stringently enforced. Without first dissolving local
government autonomy and dissipating local governmental
protectionism and corruption, the proper enforcement of
Chinese patent is highly improbable. This Part first acknowledges
the major advances that the third amendment has brought to
patent protection in China, but it also recognizes that these
advantages cannot be realized if the Chinese patent law is not
properly enforced. It then discusses the obstacles to the
enforcement of the Chinese patent law and suggests how to
eliminate these obstacles.
The third amendment has made significant changes to the
Chinese patent law and perhaps eases the minds of international
investors looking to introduce a new drug into the Chinese
market.2s0 Certain provisions of the amendment reflect the
Chinese government's dedication to improving patent protection
in China,21 but some scholars question whether some of the
provisions will be abused.2 12 The amended Chinese patent law is,
however, more in line with international standards.233
Despite the improvements that the third amendment
brought to Chinese patent law, the law could still benefit from
additional changes. Instead of giving courts the option of
230. See supra Part II (addressing the provisions of the newly amended Chinese
patent law that tighten patent protection).
231. See supra notes 163-82 and accompanying tcxt (discussing the provisions that
increase the fines for patent infringement, help preserve evidence, and redefine
novelty).
232. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
problems of the compulsory licensing provisions).
233. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (stating that the third amendment
madc the Chinesc patcnt law morc in linc with the intcrnational standard).
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holding certain infringers criminally liable,234 the Chinese patent
law should mandate that drug counterfeiters be held criminally
liable in all cases to deter future counterfeiting. Pharmaceutical
counterfeiting is a serious offense that can affect the global
economy and health.2 35 Even though the amended Chinese
patent law increases the fines for infringement, it is unclear
whether infringees would be given a portion of that money. If
not, additional funding should be provided for administrative
proceedings. A large portion of the confiscated profits of the
guilty infringers should be used to compensate the infringees.2 3 6
The lack of a discovery process has also significantly
hindered US litigants, who are accustomed to having such a
process, from successfully winning a patent litigation suit in
China.2 37 Mandating a discovery process may uncover evidence
that may otherwise be undiscovered. In addition, ensuring that
judges are given as much relevant evidence as possible may
encourage better-informed decisions.
Improving patent protection rights is the first step to
developing an efficient patent protection system, but proper
enforcement of those rights is equally important. China needs to
address how to effectively enforce the Chinese patent law. The
existence of local governmental corruption and protectionism is
a major hindrance in the enforcement of patent protection
laws.2 3 8 As long as local government officials refuse to ensure
effective adjudication of patent infringement cases and proper
enforcement of patent protection rights, pharmaceutical
counterfeiting will continue to be a problem.2 19
To resolve this lack of enforcement at the local levels, the
central government can work toward changing the funding
234. See supra notes 60, 92 (citing Ar ticles 58 and 64 of the Chincse patent law prior
to 2009, which state that if the circumstances are serious enough, the infringer should
be prosecuted for criminal liability).
235. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the economic and health
risks of counterfeit drugs).
236. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the disadvantages of an
administrative system that offers minimal monetary compensation for infringecs).
237. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing how plaintiffs in China
must collect their evidence).
238. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (discussing how local
governmental protectionism and governmental corruption perpetuates pharmaceutical
counterfeiting).
239. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
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system of administrative agencies. Instead of having local
governments provide the necessary funds for administrative
agencies, the central government can provide that funding,
which would dissipate the influence of local governments over
administrative agencies. 240 The central government can also
develop a training program for SIPO agents to ensure that there
is uniformity among the SIPO offices in determining if patents
are invalid or are being infringed.
To ensure unbiased adjudication of patent infringement
cases, the central government can also provide adequate training
for judges. The Supreme People's Court has wisely reserved
about fifty courts to be first-instance courts for adjudication of
patent infringement cases, 241 reasoning that patent infringement
cases tend to be more complex. The judges of those courts,
however, are often not properly trained, causing the adjudication
of patent infringement cases to be slow and inefficient.242
With the counterfeit business so deeply integrated into the
local economies of certain regions, a crackdown on these
businesses may lead to the economic demise of these regions.24 .
To prevent this, these regions' economies must be slowly weaned
off the counterfeiting business. More funding should be
provided for pharmaceutical and biotechnological research and
development. Providing Chinese companies with the funding to
develop their own drugs may redirect their energies from
counterfeiting to developing their own patentable drugs. The
central government should develop a task force whose sole duty
is to investigate and stop counterfeiting businesses.
Simultaneously encouraging companies to engage in legitimate
business practices and to halt counterfeiting actions will help
facilitate the gradual movement of local economies' dependency
on counterfeiting businesses to legitimate businesses.
240. See supra notes 63, 214-29 and accompanying text (discussing how the local
governments are hesitant to provide proper lunding for administrative agencies because
the drug counterfeiting business accounts for a large portion of the local economny).
241. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (stating that about fifty Intermncdiatc
People's Courts were appointed to be first instance courts for patent infringement
cases).
242. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (commenting on how judges' lack
of expertise negatively impacts the adjudicative process of patent infringement cases).
243. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (stating that the shutdown of the
countcrfeiting business in certain places would seriously harim local cconomics).
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Other countries' distrust of China's patent system is another
hurdle that China needs to overcome. 244 China needs to build up
other countries' trust in her patent system by demonstrating that
she is serious about protecting patents. Fortunately for China,
her rich resources and large population have lured many
international companies to invest in her economy, making her
the third-largest trading nation and the fourth-largest economy
in the world.245 Many multinational companies, however, warily
enter the Chinese economy.246 If China wishes to legitimize
herself as a major player in the global economy, she should invest
more time and energy in improving and enforcing her IP laws.247
There are mixed feelings surrounding the third amendment
to the Chinese patent law. Some scholars think it is a major leap
forward, 248 while others are still proceeding with caution.249
China cannot win other nations' trust instantly, but she can take
further steps to show her dedication to improving her patent
protection system, such as encouraging her domestic companies
to develop their own products, which she has already begun
doing by implementing the absolute novelty requirement into
her patent law.
Until China is recognized as having an effective patent law
system, multinational corporations should consider getting their
patent infringement cases adjudicated, even though it may take
longer than the administrative route.S'o While judges are not
completely free from influence by the local government,25'
244. See, e.g., supra note 5 and accompanying text (stating that the United States
claims that China has one of the least effective IP' regimes in the world).
245. See supra note 47 and accompanying tcxt (citing China's standing in the global
economy).
246. See, e.g., supra note 145 and accompanying text (stating that GlaxoSmithKline
probably abandoned its Avandia patent bccausc it was contemptuous of the Chinese
patent law).
247. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text (discussing China's desire to
becomnc an intcgral player in the global economy and attcmnpts to improve her IP systcm
to accomplish this goal).
248. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text (presenting the scholarly
arguments in favor of the third amncndmncnt to the Chinesc patcnt law).
249. See supra notes 204-42 and accompanying text (presenting the different
outlooks on the third amendment to the Chinese patent law).
250. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (stating that intcrnational litigants
might have to wait several years before their patent infringement cases are adludicated).
251. See supra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing the challenges judges
might facc whcn they do not rule to the favor of the local govcrinments).
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litigants might consider the option of having their case
adjudicated in a region that is stricter about enforcing the
Chinese patent law.252
CONCLUSION
The Chinese patent law has changed dramatically since its
enactment in 1984. As more and more multinational companies
invest in the Chinese market, China is increasingly feeling the
pressure to improve her IP system.253 These corporations,
however, are cautious to participate in the Chinese economy
because of the prevalence of counterfeiting in China.254 Perhaps
the most dangerous of all the counterfeiting businesses is
pharmaceutical counterfeiting. 255
For many years, it seemed that the Chinese patent law was
ineffective in stopping pharmaceutical counterfeiting, but the
third amendment brought a promising glow as China tightens
patent protection laws and increases the penalty of patent
infringement. 5 6 The effectiveness of the newly amended Chinese
patent law, however, is notjust contingent upon the substance of
the law, but will largely depend on how effectively it is enforced.
Local protectionism and corruption pose major barriers to the
effective enforcement of these laws.25 7 If China can effectively
dilute the hold that local governments have over regional
administrative offices, then these barriers would be largely
eliminated. The Chinese central government can start by
providing more funding for pharmaceutical and
biotechnological research and development. The central
252. See, e.g., supra note 224 and accompanying text (commenting on how courts
in Beijing and Shanghai have been enforcing IIP protection rights more strictly in recent
years).
253. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (stating that China is trying to
improve her domestic IP' laws in her crusade to become a malor player in the global
economy).
254. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (stating that over 4000 new patent
infringement cases were filed in China annually in 2007 and 2008).
255. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the harmful effects of
counterfeit drugs).
256. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (stating that the third amendment
to the Chinese patent law will improve the protection of IP rights by increasing
monetary penalties).
257. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (stating that local ofncials benefit
from and support the counterfeiting businesses).
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government should also look into providing funding for
administrative agencies and properly training the judges who
handle patent infringement cases. Until the local governments'
influence over administrative agencies and courts is dissipated, it
is hard to speculate about how effectively the newly amended
Chinese patent law will be implemented and enforced and, in
turn, how the third amendment will affect pharmaceutical
counterfeiting in China. The local governments' control on local
agencies and courts will take some time to loosen; in the
meantime, other measures such as the development of task
forces to investigate and stop pharmaceutical counterfeiting and
implementation of stricter criminal penalties against
counterfeiters should be taken. Victims of infringement can also
help themselves by choosing a jurisdiction that is more diligent
in pursuing counterfeiting.
